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"[Where law ends, tyranny begins."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite what some argue is an overregulated employment relationship,2
for millions of workers in the United States,3 the above quote represents
their daily experience when they leave their homes and commute to their
places of work. While at times in our history tyranny in the workplace has
taken openly hostile and even violent forms,4 my reference here to a state
of tyranny in the workplace is intended to convey a different idea. My
vision of tyranny refers to a value system (which has had legal
implications) that places individuals in their roles as employees in a
subservient capacity vis-d-vis the employer.
A look at the development of labor and employment law in the U.S.
reveals one astonishing principle. There is an underlying assumption that
employers own the time and activities of employees, and thus any change
in the allocation of rights between employers and employees has to be
justified against the "interference" with the rights of employers. For
example, whenever legislation has been introduced intended to protect
workers' rights, employers have argued that such protections will interfere
with the right of employers to control their employees.5 This argument has
been successfully made many times, and it has, I argue, shaped the debate
on workers' rights.6 By arguing that the employees' time and activities are
1. William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Debate in the Lords on the Address of Thanks (Jan. 9,
1770), in 16 PARL. HIST. ENO. 644, 665 (1996) (paraphrasing JOHN LOCKE, SEcOND TRFATISE OF
CIVL GOVERNMENT 202 (Russell Kirk ed., 1955) (1690)).
2. See generally PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS
SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994); see also David Weil, Implementing Employment Regulation:
Insights on the Determinants of Regulatory Performance, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 429,430 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997) (describing the increase in
the number of programs administered by the U.S. Department of Labor, from 18 in 1940, to 180
in the mid-1990s).
3. Currently only ten percent ofthe labor force is unionized or covered under the protections
of a collective bargaining agreement. FOUNDATIONSOF LABORANDEMPLOYMENTLAW iii (Samuel
Estreichier & Stewart J. Schwab eds., 2000).
4. See generallyTHOMASR. BROOKS, TOILANDTROUBLE:AHSTORYOFAMERICAN LABOR
(1964) (describing the violent confrontations between workers and employers during the early years
of the development of the labor movement in the United States).
5. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 7-10 (1983)
(arguing that one of the basic assumptions underlying the development of labor law in the United
States is the subordinate nature of employee rights vis-A-vis the property rights of the employer).
6. Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause For Termination Rules and Economic
[Vol. 53
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employers' "property," employers have successfully shifted the default
allocation of rights in their favor. The argument, which according to
employers has become a truism, can be succinctly stated as follows: since
employers "buy" the time of employees, employers presumptively have
the right to control all aspects of the employees' life while at work, and at
times even outside of work. This argument can be found in both academic
writings7 and in judicial opinions.'
The validity of this argument depends on the answer to a critical
question, which often has been ignored by courts and scholars alike: What
is the nature and content of the exchange entered into by the employers
and employees in employment contracts? Traditionally, the argument has
been that employees and employers arrive at tradeoffs concerning wages
and conditions of employment.9 For example, employees will accept lower
wages in exchange for better working conditions.0 While it could be
possible for employees and employers to explicitly identify all the details
of the exchange, most of the time they do not. Indeed, this feature of
employment contracts has been identified as one of the key virtues of
employment arrangements in the United States." Silence, or absence of
Efficiency, 38 EMORYL.J. 1097, 1098-99(1989) ("Although buyers and sellers of labor regularly
dicker, at least implicitly, about wages, work assignments, fringe benefits, working conditions and
many other variables, the employer usually keeps the unilateral power to terminate the employee's
job tenure."); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,951-
52 (1984) ('When the law introduces a just-cause requirement, it flies in the face of ordinary
understandings and thus rests upon an assumption that just-cause arrangements are in the broad run
of cases either more frequent or desirable than the contract at will, though neither is the case."). See
generally Stewart J. Schwab, The Law and Economics Approach to Workplace Regulation, in
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 2, at 91-123
(surveying law and economics literature related to labor and employment law).
7. Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57
OHIo ST. L.J. 671, 709-20 (describing and then criticizing the market argument to the regulation
of privacy rights in the workplace).
8. See, e.g., Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 719 P.2d 854, 857 (Or. 1986) ("It may seem harsh
that an employer can fire an employee because of dislike of the employee's personal lifestyle, but
because the plaintiffcannot show that the actions fit under an exception to the general rule, plaintiff
is subject to the traditional doctrine of 'fire at will.'").
9. See Schwab, supra note 6, at 101.02; Epstein, supra note 6, at 963-67.
10. Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Workers' Compensation, Wages, and the Risk of Injury, in NEW
PERSPECIVES IN WORKERS COMPENSATION 74-81 (John F Burton, Jr. ed., 1988) (discussing the
dynamics of wage differentials arising to compensate workers for unsafe and unhealthy working
conditions). See generally ROBERT FLANAGAN ET AL., ECONOMICS OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP 161-67 (1989) (analyzing how factors like work environment and risk of injury
influence an employee's job choice).
11. See Freed & Polsby, supra note 6, at 1098-99. Legal scholars, primarily in the law and
economics tradition, have explained this feature ofemploymentcontracts by referencingtransaction
costs economics. See Michael J. Phillips, Disclaimers of Wrongful Discharge Liability: Time for
a Crackdown?, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 1131, 1165 (1992) (describing the transaction costs associated
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details, has become therefore a key, dominating feature of employment
contracts and, in turn, of employment law." The practical effect of this
argument has been the development of default rules used to solve disputes
arising out of the employment relationship) 3
In this Article, I question whether the parties to employment contracts
are as "silent" as we have deemed them to be: By looking in more detail
at the exchanges employers and employees explicitly make, as for example
the manner and level of compensation, we can derive rules that more
accurately reflect what exchanges they intended. In particular, I will argue
that while the employer clearly "buys" something when hiring an
employee, it is critical to distinguish what the employer is buying.
Different arrangements can be conceptualized in which employers will
purchase different "things" from employees. Thus, a first step in
understanding the employment relationship requires us to distinguish
among the different exchanges entered into by employers and employees.
In particular, by looking at the arrangements the parties have made with
respect to how employees get paid, that is, the "basis of pay," we can
obtain some information regarding the terms to which the parties have
agreed.
In a sense, this Article could be understood as juxtaposing the
employment law area and the recent and interesting contract law debate
with negotiations over job security provisions). Basically, the argument goes, because of high
transaction costs, the parties to employment contracts are better off by only defining the outward
parameters of the employment relationship and leaving the details unspecified. "There is one last
way in which the contract at will has an enormous advantage over its rivals. It is very cheap to
administer." Epstein, supra note 6, at 970.
12. "Yet labor contracts are commonly said to differ fundamentally from other commercial
contracts, because they are on one view 'by design, an incomplete form of contracting': workers
give no concrete consideration to employers in exchange for the agreed-upon wage because the
concrete limits of performance are left blank." Marc Linder & Larry Zacharias, Opening Coase's
Other BlackBox: Why Workers Submit to Vertical Integration Into Firms, 18 J. CORP. L. 371,404
(1993) (footnotes omitted).
13. Forexample, lawandeconomics scholarshaveproposed anumberofdefault rules, which
they argue, derive from the contracting parties' behavior. Randy E. Barnett, The Sound ofSilence:
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 864-67 (1992) (describing the
development of default rules in contract law); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87-95 (1989)
(developing a theory of default rules); Robert E. Scott, 4 Relational Theory of Default Rules for
Commercial Contracts, 19 L LEGAL STUD. 597, 597-616 (1990) (developing criteria for the
selection of optimal default rules). These scholars argue that since employers and employees enter
"vaguely" defined employment contracts, in which they chose to be "silent" about most of the
details of the exchange, courts should adopt default rules that are consistent with the parties'
behavior. See David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform:
Employment At Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 990-92 (1998) (describing the
development of employment law default rules).
t ol. 53
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between "formalists," "anti-formalists," and "anti-antiformalists."1 4 This
debate, which has its origins in the development of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 5 more than six decades ago, has been
rekindled in the last few years.16 The debate has occurred in three stages.17
In the first stage, formalism, which preceded the development of the UCC,
"lawyers aspired to deduce the vast edifice of contractual rules from an
essentialist understanding of the nature of promise and consent." 8 The
second stage, which is captured in the UCC, rejected the "deductive
system"' 9 that the formalists had construed, focusing instead on the
premise that contract law should be based on the unwritten customs and
usages of trade that are practiced by the contracting parties.2"
The "anti-formalism" approach, as Professor Lisa Bernstein points out,
is justified on five basic premises: that contracts are incomplete because
rationality is bounded; the high transaction costs associated with
negotiating fully contingent contracts; the difficulty in drafting fully
contingent contracts; that customs and norms are understood by merchants
to be part of their agreement and thus are good indications of their intent;
and finally, that customs and norms tend to be efficient." This approach
is the intellectual basis of the UCC,22 as best evidenced by the UCC use of
14. SeeDavid Charnay, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI.L.REV. 842,843 (1999).
15. U.C.C. § 2 (1977).
16. For example, the University of Chicago Law Review Symposium on "Formalism
Revisited" included a section on Formalism in Commercial Law. 66 U. CIF. L. REv. 710,710-859
(1999).
17. Chamay, supra note 14, at 842-43.
18. Id at 842. More generally, formalism has been defined as "adherence to a norm's
prescription without regard to the background reasons the norm is meant to serve." Larry
Alexander, "With Me. It's All er Nuthin ": Formalisn in Law and Morality, 66 U. Ci. L. REv. 530,
531 (1999).
19. Chamay, supra note 14, at 842.
20. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable EmpiricalBasis ofArticle2 s Incorporation Strategy:
A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710,710-12 (1999) ("The Uniform Commercial Code, the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, and the modern Lex Mercatoria are
based on the premise that unwritten customs and usages of trade exist and that in commercial
disputes they can, and should, be discovered and applied by courts .... More broadly, the idea that
courts in deciding cases should look to immanent business norms, consisting of both the practices
of contracting parties and unwritten customs, is a fundamental tenet of the legal realist approach
to contract interpretation...." (footnotes omitted)).
21. Id. at 746-47.
22. Id at 710. But see Richard Epstein, Confusion About Custom: Disentangling Informal
Customsfrom Standard ContractualProvisions, 66 U. CH. L. REV. 821, 821-23 (1999) (countering
that custom is still plainly influential in commercial dealings).
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the concepts of "usage of trade," 3 "course of dealing," and "course of
performance." 25
The "anti-formalism" approach has been attacked along various
fronts.26 For example, various commentators have questioned the claim
about the efficiency of the customs that the UCC seeks to incorporate. 7
Others have questioned both the competency of courts in identifying and
incorporating the business customs into contracts,2' and more
fundamentally whether the parties prefer to have customs enforced by
means of legal sanctions.29 More recently, even the very existence of the
customs that the UCC seeks to incorporate has been called into question."
This group of challenges, which Professor Chamay refers to as the
"anti-antiformalism" stage of the debate,31 rejects the incorporationist
methodology of anti-formalism, and in particular the gap-filling use of
custom.32 Having rejected the Hayekian view that "efficient custom should
evolve through the natural selection of rules and practices,"3 3 anti-
23. A "usage of trade" is "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of
observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with
respect to the transaction in question." U.C.C. § 1-205(2).
24. "Course of dealing" refers to "a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a
particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of
understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." U.C.C. § 1-205(1).
25. "Course of performance" relates to the behavior of the parties in the present contract and
requires that a contract "involve[ repeated occasions for performance by either party with
knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other" and
that the other "accept or acquiesce in [the performance] without objection." Christopher R.
Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Code, and International CommercialArbitration, 33
VAND. . TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 85 (2000). Such course of performance will be relevant to determine
the meaning of the agreement "[w]here the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for
performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for
objection to it by the other." U.C.C. § 2-208(1).
26. Bernstein, supra note 20, at 712-13; Charnay, supra note 14, at 842-43; Omri Ben-
Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U. CH. L. REV. 781, 782
(1999).
27. Bernstein, supra note 20, at 712; Ben-Shahar, supra note 26, at 782.
28. Bernstein, supra note 20, at 712-13.
29. Charnay, supra note 14, at 842-43.
30. Bernstein, supra note 20, at 713; Ben-Shahar, supra note 26, at 782.
31. Charnay, supra note 14, at 842.
32. It appears from a review of the literature that not even anti-antiformalists are willing to
completely do away with the use of norms and customs. For example, Professor Bernstein develops
a categorization of norms (e.g., relationship-creating norms and relationship-preserving norms),
which are important in sustaining transactions in particular types of markets. See Bernstein, supra
note 20, at 760-76.
33. Id. at 754.
[Vol. 53
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antiformalists are left with the task of developing "a prescription for a
formalist contract jurisprudence."
This task is already underway, and some solid, intriguing work has
already surfaced. Professor Bernstein, for example, points out the
importance of distinguishing between different kinds of norms and the
different uses parties make of those norms.35 She argues that the norms
that courts are likely to apply when a contractual relationship has broken
down ("endgame norms") are likely to differ from those that the parties are
likely to adopt when creating and maintaining a relationship
("relationship-creating" and "relationship-preserving" norms).36
In a different vein, and to some extent arising out of a defense of the
gap-filling approach, Professor Epstein suggests a possible way to salvage
the use of norms and customs is by distinguishing between "implicit
custom" and "standard provisions. ' "7 Professor Epstein argues that "a
customary commercial term" can refer to those terms that the courts would
use when commercial agreements are silent (implicit custom), or to those
"express provisions that the parties commonly incorporate into
commercial arrangements" (standard provisions)." Most of the criticism
of the incorporationist approach of anti-formalism, argues Professor
Epstein, applies forcefully to implicit customs, but should not call into
question the validity of standard provisions.39 Standard provisions, in his
view, "should bind, no matter how great our doubts about the validity of
implicit customs that are said to fill gaps. '"
These, as well as other recent developments in this literature,4' point
towards a renewed interest in conducting more in-depth analysis of the
subject matter over which the parties are contracting, that being
commercial contracts or employment contracts, before making a policy
decision to rely on customs and norms as contract gap fillers. Professor
Charnay, for example, suggests that anti-antiformalism ought to consider
the solving of legal disputes, yet with the understanding that relationship-
creating and relationship-preserving norms might not have been intended
to govern end-game situations but in "accordance with an 'all things
considered' judgment of the competing claims of the two transactors." 2
34. See Charnay, supra note 14, at 843.
35. See Bernstein, supra note 20, at 760-76.
36. Id at 769-70.
37. Epstein, supra note 22, at 823.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 829.
41. See generally Drahozal, supra note 25; Ben-Shahar, supra note 26.
42. See Charnay, supra note 14, at 852.
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It is in this sense that this Article develops an anti-antiformalist
approach to employment law. Unlike the commercial law area, in the
employment law area there is nothing similar to the beacon of anti-
formalism represented in the Uniform Commercial Code. However, the
anti-formalist tendencies of employment law can be clearly seen in the use
of default rules that permeate some of the most important issues in the
area, as for example the employment-at-will debate43 and the debate over
privacy issues in the workplace." By questioning the use of default rules
in the employment law area and focusing instead on a more detailed
analysis of the subject matter under consideration-the employment
contract-this Article attempts to advance our understanding of the
regulations involving the employment relationship.45
Part II commences by providing an expanded definition of "work.' 6
The objective here is to explore possible dimensions of work not
previously included in the employment and labor law discourse. This Part
concludes with the observation that work and labor markets are
heterogeneous institutions, which differ along a number of important
dimensions such as the objectives pursued by the parties and the incentive
structures utilized in achieving those objectives.'
In Part III, I discuss the role that compensation plays in the design and
implementation of labor contracts.4 One aspect that is constant about all
work arrangements in labor markets is the use of compensation.
Surprisingly, while labor economists have now for over two decades made
significant advances in understanding the implications of compensation
arrangements,49 little of this discussion has been incorporated into the
discussion of the legal dimensions of employment contracts. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, I argue that the parties to employment contracts
have not been silent in their allocation of rights and duties.5 0 Employers
and employees constantly make, I argue, conscious contractual tradeoffs
when they enter employment contracts. Reliance then upon default rules,
as is normally found in the literature, is unwarranted.
43. See generally Epstein, supra note 6.
44. See generally Kim, supra note 7.
45. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 150-53 (1997)
(challenging the default rule approach as based on the erroneous assumption that parties are well
informed as to the level of protection afforded by the law).
46. See infra notes 56-82 and accompanying text.
47. See discussion infra Part II.B.
48. See infra notes 85-224 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Introduction: Do Compensation Policies Matter?, 43
INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV. 3-5 (1990) (discussing special issue on developments in the study of
compensation practices).
50. See infra notes 185-224 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53
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In Part IV, I apply this framework to two areas in employment law: the
employment-at-will debate and employees' privacy rights.5' This Part
develops two arguments. First, as a matter of contract law, courts should
consider the information provided by compensation arrangements in
employment contracts, as constituting the basis for enforceable legal rights
regarding job security and privacy claims.52 Unilateral changes by the
employer, for example, regarding monitoring practices without the
employee's approval could result in a breach of contract claim. In the
context ofjob security, dismissals that fail to comport with the risk-sharing
understandings that are reflected in the compensation terms should
similarly be the basis of a breach of contract claim. Second, and probably
a less controversial implication of the argument developed in the Article,
courts should in general pay attention to the information that is available
in compensation agreements and use this information in informing their
decisions, whether based on contract or tort law.53
Part V explores the implications of my argument for contract law
theory and proposes some alternative ways of incorporating the model into
contract law discourse.' Part VI concludes the Article.55
H. THE WORK CONTEXT
A What Is Work?
Work can be defined as "any human effort adding use value to goods
or services."56 Under this definition, work could occur not only in the
traditional context of labor markets but also in other contexts including,
volunteer work, household labor, and the arts and crafts.5 7 What
51. See infra notes 226-369 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 226-369 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 226-369 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 371-89 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 390-92 and accompanying text.
56. CHRIs TILLY & CHARLEs TILLY, WORK UNDER CAPITALISM 22 (1998). This definition
is rather broad and intentionally includes exchanges that occur not only in labor markets but also
in other environments such as, for example, the household and local communities. Id. While broad,
this definition is discriminating enough to leave out some activities such as expressive and
consumptive acts. Id. at 23. The effort involved in consumptive and expressive activities does not
result in added value, which is available to others, and thus such kinds of effort do not amount to
work under the definition here proposed. Id.
A similar definition was provided by the United States Supreme Court in Tennessee Coal, Iron
& Railroad v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944). The Court held that under the
Fair Labor Standard Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000), "work" means "physical ormental exertion
(whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and
primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business." Id.
57. TILLY & TILLY, supra note 56, at 30-32.
677
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distinguishes labor markets from these other contexts is that the work that
occurs in labor markets is characterized by a high degree of "short-term
monetization" and the extent of "time discipline." 58 "Short-term
monetization" refers to the extent to which workers exert work effort on
the expectation of monetary compensation in the short term.59 "Time-
discipline" refers to the degree to which the individual exerting effort or
someone else decides on the disposition of a worker's effort within the
working day."'6 Labor markets, generally, involve both a high degree of
short-term monetization and also a high degree of time-discipline.6 ' That
is, work in labor markets is characterized by the creation of incentives
under which individuals work to be compensated in some relatively short
term and where their time is controlled by the recipient of the work effort
(e.g., more commonly the employer).62
The distinction between labor markets and the other contexts in which
work occurs has been amply recognized in the literature.63 Somewhat less
recognized, however, is the variance that exists across the monetization
and time-discipline dimensions even within labor markets. For example,
within the context of labor markets, unskilled labor is subject to a larger
degree of time-discipline than skilled workers, with professions being
subject to even a less amount of time discipline. Entrepreneurs, who might
still operate in the labor market context, are similarly subject to less time
discipline than unskilled and even skilled workers. Entrepreneurs are also
subject to less short-term monetization, given their usually longer
investment horizons and their willingness to undertake greater risks in
these investments. This analysis indicates that there exists, even within
labor markets, non-trivial variation in the tradeoffs that parties make when
entering employment relationships. 6
58. Id. at31.
59. Id at 30.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 31 (displaying findings at Figure 2.1).
62.
With the frequent intervention of state agencies, households, and organizations
such as trade associations and labor unions, capitalists and workers today create
labor markets where workers deliver a high proportion of all work for monetary
compensation at the scale of the transaction, the piece, the hour, the day, or the
week, and producers yield control of their time and effort to others, at least for the
paid workday's duration.
Id.
63. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work The First Woman's Rights Claims
Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALEL.J. 1073 (1994) (drawing attention
to the amount of work that is actually performed outside the world of wages).
64. TiLLY & TILLY, supra note 56, at 31.
[Vol. 53
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Another issue, which has not received a complete treatment in the
analysis of work, is the discussion regarding the objectives that employers
bring to the workplace and the incentives they utilize to achieve those
objectives.65 The employer's basic function is to motivate employees to
65. While the issue of objectives and incentives has been explored in the literature, most
previous work has focused on a single issue, normally dictated by the paradigm being used.
Traditionally, theories of work have adhered to one of three major paradigms: Neoclassical,
Marxist, and Institutional. Id. at 5-12. Each of these theories tends to focus on a particular
dimension of work, normally to the exclusion of others. For example, Neoclassical theories have
traditionally been uninterested in the concept of work. Id at 5-8. The basic view is best captured
by the remarks ofPaul Samuelson: "In a perfectly competitive market, it really doesn't matter who
hires whom: so have labor hire 'capital."' Paul Samuelson, Wages and Interest: A Modern
Dissection of Marxian Economic Models, 47 AM. ECON. REv. 884, 894 (1957). Neoclassical
theories emphasize the existence of forces that help prevent deviations from market outcomes.
TILLY & TILLY, supra note 56, at 5-8. A key implication of this approach is that workers get paid
the value of their marginal product, that is, the value of the marginal contribution they provide to
the production process. Id at 8.
Marxists theories ofwork emphasize class-consciousness as opposed to individual preferences.
TILLY & TILLY, supra note 56, at 10. Three propositions derive from this emphasis in class level
consciousness. Samuel S. Bowles, TheProduction Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasan,
Neo-Hobbesian, and Marian Models, 75 AM.ECON. REV. 16,17-18 (1985). First, efficiency isnot
the only goal pursued by the owners of capital; at times, mechanisms that help capital to exercise
control over labor will be favored. Id Second, discrimination among equally productive workers
is likely to exist, since it is in the interests of the owners of capital to foster division among
workers. Id. Finally, significant involuntary unemployment is a permanent, necessary feature of a
capitalist economy. Id. Wages, under Marxist models, are determined not on the basis of marginal
productivity, but based instead on a combination of class struggles and history. Tilly & Tilly, supra
note 56, at 10. Work, accordingly, is defined by the existing social relationships within a firm.
These relationships are not entirely explained on the basis of either technological changes or even
market relationships.
Institutional theories rely on the use of norms, customs, and institutions to interject a certain
amount of contingency into models of labor market. Id. at 11. Similar to Marxist theories,
institutional theories acknowledge power asymmetries between employers and employees. Id.
However, institutional theories point out the existence of "countervailing forces" such as labor
organizations and interests groups, which facilitate a bargaining process where economic outcomes
are not pre-determined. Id. Regarding individual preferences, the focus of institutional theories is
on group norms. Wage determination, for example, is based not on calculations of marginal
productivity, but on notions of relative wage comparisons and fairness. See generally ARTHUR
Ross, TRADE UNION WAGE POLICY 53-64 (1948) (introducing the concept of "orbits of coercive
comparison"); John Dunlop, The Task of Contemporary Wage Theory, in THE THEORY OF WAGE
DETERmATION 3 (John Dunlop ed., 1957) (discussing the concept of "wage contours"). While
in institutional models individuals are believed to behave rationally, this rationality is "bounded."
TILLY & TILLY, supra note 56, at 12 (crediting HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A
STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION (1945) for the
concept of "bounded rationality"). The implication of the notion of "bounded rationality" is that
managers' behavior, for example, is shaped in many instances by customs, beliefs, and even
arbitrary experimentation, so as to make their behavior essentially non-rational. Id. From the
institutional perspective work is explained as a set of smaller relationships shaped by conditions
in the product market, technology, custom, and a variety of institutions (e.g., labor organizations
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exert work effort,'" in order to accomplish one or more of three primary
objectives: quality, efficiency, and power.67
Quality focuses on the question of "how closely the use values
produced by various levels of a worker's effort approximate an ideal
configuration of product characteristics." ' Efficiency denotes elimination
of waste and is at the core of the neoclassical model. These two objectives
are the most commonly used in the literature, and they are central to both
neoclassical and institutional accounts of work.
Power is defined in terms of how much quality effort the employer
receives from the employee relative to the level of incentives provided.69
Thus, a powerful employer in this context is one that receives high quality
effort on the basis of small incentives."
To achieve these objectives, employers utilize three kinds of
incentives: compensation,7 ' commitment, and coercion.Y These
incentives are grouped into what are referred to as "work contracts." Work
contracts are enforceable agreements that include features like time
durations and enforcement mechanisms and that stipulate the parties,
and collective bargaining). Id. at 11.
66.
How does the immediate recipient (R) of work's product get useful effort from the
producer (P)? From R's viewpoint, P must have the propensity and capacity to
perform or to learn the task in question, as well as the material means to do so.
From P's view point, R must supply informatidn about what task to perform and
how to perform it, as well as incentives to do so.
TILLY & TiLLY, supra note 56, at 72.
67. Id. at 84. How do we explain that employers are able to pursue objectives other than
efficiency? First, "[clompetitive pressure is blunted... by the fact that all businesses are in the
same boat All confront bounded rationality and multiple objectives." Id. at 11I. Second, "large
sections of capitalist economies are buffered from competition." Id. Third, "potentially more
efficient strategies are also often excluded, or at least rendered unattractive, by short time horizons
and externalities." Id
Thus workers, like employers, pursue multiple objectives. They work for pay, to
be sure, but they also toil for pride in a job well done, for the enjoyment of
learning, for the appreciation of bosses and coworkers, for continuing access to
the social world of the workplace, and forthe purpose offfulfilling traditions or the
expectations of others.
Id. at 116.
68. Id. at 84.
69. Id. at 85.
70. "[I]fR gets extensive and/or high-quality effort from P for small inputs of incentives, R
exercises great power over P." Id.
71. Compensation refers to the offer of contingent rewards. Id. at 74.
72. Commitment refers to the invocation of loyalty and solidarity. Id.
73. Coercion refers to the use of threats to inflict harm. Id
[Vol. 53
HeinOnline  -- 53 Fla. L. Rev. 680 2001
AN77TI-ANI7FORMALISTAPPROACH TO CON"R CTAND EMPLOYMENTLA W
rights, obligations, and sanctions. 4 In this sense, work contracts govern the
process by which effort is exerted in work transactions.
Work contracts differ in terms of the mix of incentives that are used to
generate effort. An infinite number of combinations of commitment,
coercion, and compensation exist.76 For example, work contracts involving
unskilled labor are more likely to rely on a mixture of compensation and
coercion of either the "drive" or "payment by results" method. The system
of drive provides employers with significant control over their workers'
time and effort by relying on extensive monitoring, standardization of
tasks, penalties for non-compliance, and threats of unemployment."
Payments by results involve compensating employees on the basis of what
is actually produced. 8 These arrangements rely on piecework or
commissions.' For work contracts involving skilled labor, there is
normally less reliance on coercion and more on commitment and
compensation.' Rewards for loyalty are common, as are incentives
systems arranged in the form of tournaments and internal labor markets.8
One remaining issue is left. What factors affect the selection of one
work contract over another? Can we explain why there is a variance in the
mix of incentives in work contracts? The structure of the work contract is,
to a large extent, determined by the primary objective pursued by the
employer.'2 For example, where efficiency is the primary goal, we should
expect to observe reliance on compensation, while quality is likely to be
pursued via commitment and power via coercion.
74. Id. at 75.
75. Id Work contracts differ from non-work contracts, in that they involve the expenditure
of human effort that adds or transfers use value (i.e., the work transaction). Id. Non-work contracts
include consumption only contracts. Id.
76. Id. at 74.
77. Id. at 170.
78. Id.
79. Id
80. Id. at 76-77.
81. Id. at 117.
82. The objectives pursued by the employer depend in turn on the nature of the specific
context. For example, quantity, with just scant attention to quality, predominates very competitive
industries, such as fast-food service. In the Health Care industry, quality has traditionally been a
primary objective, although changes inthe market structure ofthe industry are calling into question
that understanding. The domestic worker relationship has been characterized on the other hand by
a focus on the employer's power over the employee with the other objectives taking a secondary
role. See Peggie R. Smith, Regulating Paid Household Work Class, Gender, Race, and Agendas
ofReform, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 851, 890-92 (1999).
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B. What Do Parties Exchange?
The framework discussed above suggests that the employment
relationship involves a complex set of transactions. These transactions are
grouped into work contracts which are designed in turn to pursue different
objectives and which combine different incentives. There is a connection
both between the type of work transaction involved and the objective that
is pursued and also between the objective that is being pursued and the
type of incentives that is adopted. Thus, for example, an employer that
pursues quantity as the primary objective will be more likely to rely on a
mix of incentives that emphasizes compensation and to some extent
power, without much concern for commitment. On the other hand, an
employer that perceives a market need to focus on quality might have to
use a combination of incentives that emphasizes commitment and
compensation.
The framework also suggests that there is a relationship between the
various incentives. Compensation arrangements, for example, have
spillover effects on commitment and even on coercion type incentives.
Finally, the framework adopted here makes it clear that even in labor
markets, where compensation incentives tend to be dominant, there exists
variation in the kind of arrangements that form work contracts. Work
contracts vary in terms of the level of short-term monetization and the
level of time discipline.8 3 These variations are related to the kind of
incentives that are offered and to the objectives that are pursued."
Recognition ofthese relationships is central to the understanding of the
exchanges that occur when employers and employees enter employment
contracts. Unfortunately, in the rush to simplify the nature of these
exchanges, courts have often ignored the "richness" of information coded
in these contracts. In the next part, I begin to explore the sources of this
new information in more detail.
HI. THE ROLE OF COMPENSATION
A. The Functions of Pay
Establishing the employment relationship requires an agreement over
a significant number of features.' Parties must agree on what the work
83. TILLY & TILLY, supra note 56, at 75-78.
84. Id.
85. This is one issue over which there is widespread agreement across theoretical
frameworks. See, e.g., ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE 68 (1997); Freed & Polsby,
supra note 6, at 1098-99; James B. Rebitzer, Raicf'al Political Economy and the Economics of
Labor Markets, 31 J. ECON. LiT. 1394, 1394 (1993).
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transaction is all about: job duties, rights, and expectations." The parties
also must agree on the terms and form of compensation.Y Labor exchanges
tend to be open-ended in the sense that specific work activities, as well as
specific levels of work intensity, are not identified. 8
This occurs because, like any other contract, employment contracts
serve a wide variety of functions.'9 Two important functions of
employment contracts are the valuation or pricing of labor inputs and the
description ofjob duties. Employment contracts, however, serve various
other functions. For instance, employment contracts also play the role of
screening and sorting mechanisms, by allocating a labor force with
different preferences to particular jobs.9 Employment contracts are used
also as the means of allocating employment-related risksf Finally,
employment contracts also serve as incentive mechanisms.93 In this
capacity, employment contracts convey information to both parties about
preferences and about unobservable contingencies. These three functions
are explored in detail below. The initial point is that in determining the
structure of compensation, the parties to the agreement are making
complex choices about several issues. In the presence of incomplete
information, the challenge of designing employment contracts is that "of
finding the appropriate reward formula that generates incentives for the
supply of the desired inputs at the least cost in terms of inefficient risk
sharing." '94 Understanding these choices and the reasons for making them
will provide useful information in developing a legal framework to
regulate employment contracts disputes.
86. "Employment contracts, whetherexplicit or implicit, are economic instruments that serve
a wide variety of functions. Far more is involved than the mere pricing of labor inputs, the
provision ofwork incentives orthe specification ofjob descriptions." HaigR.Nalbantian, Incentive
Compensation in Perspective, in INCENTIVES, COOPERATION, AND RSK SHARiNG 3, 6 (Haig R.
Nalbantian ed., 1987).
87. TILLY & TILLY, supra note 56, at 75.
88. James B. Rebitzer, Efficiency Wages andImplicit Contracts: AnInstitutionalEvaluation,
in MICROECONOMIC ISsUES IN LABOUR ECONOMICS: NEW APPROACHES 16, 21 (Robert Drago &
Richard Perlman eds., 1989).
89. Nalbantian, supra note 86, at 6.
90. Id
91. Eg., Martin Brown & PeterPhilips, TheDecline ofPieceRates in California Canneries:
1890-1960, 25 INDUS. REL. 81, 82-83 (1986) (describing the sorting effects of compensation
systems in the cannery industry).
92. Joseph E. Stiglitz, TheDesign ofLabor Contracts: The Economics oflncentives andRisk
Sharing, in INCENTIVES, COOPERATION, AND RISK SHARING 47,50 (Haig R. Nalbantian ed., 1987).
93. Nalbantian, supra note 86, at 13-15; Stacey R. Kole, The Complexity of Compensation
Contracts, 43J. FiN. ECON. 79,81-83 (1997) (describing the incentive functions ofpay with respect
to managerial compensation).
94. Nalbantian, supra note 86, at 12.
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1. The Sorting Function
Employment contracts serve a sorting function."' Sorting refers to a
mechanism needed to match individuals' skills and preferences with
particular jobs and contractual arrangements.' The need for a sorting
device arises from the limited knowledge both parties have about the labor
market.97 Employers have incomplete information about the supply of
labor, in particular the quantity and quality of labor they will be able to
hire at a given price. 8 Employees lack complete information about all the
wage offers and the characteristics of all relevant jobs.9
In this context of incomplete information, the dilemma faced by both
employers and employees is to find the proper match between their
preferences and their needs. Employment contracts serve the function of
sorting out individual employees to proper jobs. ' Consider, for example,
an employer who faces a fairly heterogeneous labor pool with regard to the
productivity of different workers. It is likely that such an employer will
possess relatively little information, both prior to and after hiring, about
the factors that produce such a variance in the employees' productivity.10°
The employment contract, specifically the compensation structure,
provides adequate incentives for individuals to gravitate towards the type
of arrangement that maximizes their preferences. 2
2. The Risk-Sharing Function
In general, employment contracts can be understood as instruments
attempting to allocate the various contributions and rewards of the parties
to the contract.0 3 Allocating these elements requires that the risk
associated with the contract be in turn distributed between the parties."'
In particular, the risks associated with stochastic factors that could affect
95. Brown & Philips, supra note 91, at 82; Harry J. Holzer, Wages, Employer Costs, and
Employee Performance in the Firm, 43 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV. 147-S, 148-S (1990).
96. See John H. PencaveI, Work Effort, On-the-Job Screening, andAlternative Methods of
Remuneration, in I RESEARCHINLABORECONOMICS 225, 232-34 (Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed., 1972).




101. Id. at 233.
102. The incentive system is but one piece of the sorting process. Because of the likelihood
of opportunistic employee behavior, employers need to rely on other mechanisms to discover
information about the employee, once the employee is hired. Nalbantian, supra note 86, at 15-16.
103. See Stiglitz, supra note 92, at 50.
104. "Economists believe that, in general, the employment relationship is not a zero sum
game, that by structuring the employment relationship appropriately, both workers and the firm can
benefit." Id. at 47.
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income have to be allocated between employers and employees.' 5 As part
of the various complex arrangements that are made when entering
employment contracts, the parties also "negotiate" the allocation of these
risks. 10 6
Risk management theory suggests that it is efficient to allocate risk to
the party better able to bear the cost associated with any specific risk. 7 In
the employment context, since employers are generally believed to be risk-
neutral, and employees are believed to be risk-averse, employers are in a
better position to bear the risk associated with stochastic fluctuations in
income.'10 Unlike most employers, employees have a fairly limited ability
to diversify their human capital portfolio."° That is, it is much more
difficult to spread one's human capital among different projects or
functions than it is for the owners of capital to diversify their wealth
among a wide variety of investments."' Accordingly, we should expect to
see employers assuming the role of "insurers" of "employment-related
risks,' 'by insuring employees against the risks associated with income
uncertainty. This is accomplished by properly structuring the
compensation arrangements in a way that reflects the desired share of
risks."' With respect to income fluctuation, for example, the contracts
should provide for some form of guaranteed income, as opposed to a pay-
by-result agreement."' By guaranteeing employees, say, a monthly
income, the parties are shifting to the employer the risk associated with
month-to-month variations in productivity." 4 Similarly, time-based
compensation (salary and wages), as compared to result-based
compensation, tends to be associated with longer job duration." 5 For
example, it is common for wages and salaries to increase as the
105. Nalbantian,supra note 86, at 14-15; Eugene F. Fama, TimeSalary andIncentive Payoffs
in Labor Contracts, 9 J. LAB. ECON. 25,42 (1991) (modeling the choice between various forms of
compensation).
106. Stiglitz, supra note 92, at 54-61.
107. Id at 5o.
108. Id Ifemployees were not risk averse but were instead risk neutral, designing an efficient
contract would become a trivial issue. Nalbantian, supra note 86, at 12.
109. Human capital refers to the investments individuals have made in education. GARY S.
BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEOREICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, wrm SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO EDUCATION 15-17 (3d ed. 1993).
110. Nalbatian, supra note 86, at 10.
111. Id
112. Id.
113. Stiglitz, supra note 92, at 50.
114. Nalbantian, supra note 86, at 10. Notice that under such an agreement, although the risk
is shifted to the employer, employees, at least in part, are likely paying for the shift in the burden
of risk by accepting a lower wage rate. Id. at 11.
115. TILLY& TILLY, supra note 56, at 226.
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employee's seniority increases. This aspect of employment contracts has
been associated with the existence of Internal Labor Markets." 6
3. The Incentive/Monitoring Function
The manner in which compensation is structured also serves incentive
and monitoring functions. If it were possible for employers to observe at
zero cost the quantity and quality of the labor inputs provided by
employees, employees would be paid their value or marginal product.' "
Under such conditions, there would be no monitoring costs and the only
"incentive" aspect with which the employer would have to be concerned
would be that of paying employees enough to motivate them to enter the
labor force."' In the presence of informational asymmetries and positive
monitoring costs, employers are not able to observe perfectly labor input
effort." 9 Therefore, the need arises to create proxies or estimators of the
actual labor input effort.' These estimators take the form of the various
types of compensation arrangements entered as part of the employment
contract. As developed below, these could take the form of paying
individuals by the time worked or by the result or outcome of their
effort.12'
The need for the use of estimators thus arises as the result of imperfect
observation of the labor input effort."2 Imperfect observation creates
various problems. First, the fact that effort is not directly observable means
that it is impossible for the employer to attribute variations in productivity
either to worker-induced reasons, that is, shirking, or to stochastic, non-
worker controlled factors.'n Second, assuming, as described earlier,2" that
workers are risk-averse, imperfect observation is likely to result in
inefficient risk sharing.125
Against this background, employment contracts serve an important
purpose: designing a reward formula that motivates the employee to
supply the desired work effort and motivates the employer to share an
116. See infra notes 324-51 and accompanying text.
117. Robert Drago & John S. Heywood, The Choice of Payment Schemes: Australian
Establishment Data, 34 INDUs. REL. 507, 509 (1995) (estimating the determinants of incentive
schemes).
118. Nalbantian, supra note 86, at 10.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See infra notes 148-85 and accompanying text.
122. Nalbantian, supra note 86, at 10.
123. Nalbantian, supra note 86, at 11-12.
124. See supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
125. Nalbatian, supra note 86, at 11.
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"efficient" level of risk. 126 Thus, for example, a contract under which the
employee is paid exclusively by the result of his or her effort will include
strong incentives for the supply of adequate job efforts.2' Such a contract,
however, is likely to lead to inefficient risk-sharing.' 2 ' Exclusive time-
based compensation leads to opposite results-more efficient risk-sharing
but weaker incentives.129
Closely related to the incentive function ofcompensation arrangements
are the monitoring features of employment contracts. 3° In the same way
as different compensation agreements have different incentives effects, the
employment contract also contains information about the level of
monitoring of the employee's effort that is incorporated into the
employment relationship. Monitoring, in the employment contract context,
is intended to increase the level of information concerning employees'
work effort. Monitoring of work effort thus can be understood as either a
complement or a substitute to the incentive function.33 As a substitute,
monitoring might serve the function of increasing the probability that
shirking will be detected. 32 By increasing the probability of detection,
monitoring increases the costs of shirking, potentially affecting decisions
by employees concerning theirjob efforts. Asacomplement, monitoring
serves to implement the incentive system. The development of an
incentive system requires information about work-effort inputs." The
choice among the various forms of compensation is thus related to the
assessment employers make regarding their ability to monitor effort or to
monitor the quality of the final product or service. The more costly it is for
the employer to meter the output of the employee, the less likely the
employer is to use compensation arrangements that require output
monitoring. Instead, the employer will rely on compensation agreements
that are time based, accompanied by supervision of work effort. 3 When
output is measurable at little cost, a results-based compensation agreement
is more likely to be used. In the latter case, the employer will monitor the
quality of the output as opposed to the effort.
126. Id. at 12.
127. Id; see also Charles Brown, Firms" Choice of Method of Pay, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 165-S, 171-S (1990) (testing the theory that firms choose their methods of pay by balancing
the gains from more precise links between performance and pay against monitoring costs).
128. Nalbantian, supra note 86, at 16.
129. Id at 15-16.
130. Id
131. Id
132. Id. at 14.
133. Id. at 13.
134. Id at 14.
135. Pencavel, supra note 96, at 232.
20011
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In addition to the relationship between form of compensation and
monitoring, there is also research indicating that different expectations
concerning the type of monitoring that will take place at work vary within
salary type contracts. Research on wage structure demonstrates that there
is a relationship between wages and supervision. 36 Among the various
factors that influence determination of wages are the type of supervision
and the nature of the work that a firm is likely to provide.'37 Early research
in labor economics suggested that supervision was an undesirable work
condition and thus that increased supervision might be associated with
higher wages since firms would have to pay a wage differential to
compensate employees for the less desirable working conditions.'
More recent research, however, points out that higher wages are most
likely to relate to low levels of supervision. Two alternative rationales
have been advanced. First it has been argued that higher wages increase
the costs to the employee of being fired and thus increase the likelihood of
self-supervision, while at the same time reducing the need for external
monitoring. Under those conditions, we should observe firms that engage
in little supervision paying higher wages.'39 In the alternative, it also has
been argued that what makes the high wage/low supervision incentive
structure possible is not the threat of dismissal implicit in the efficiency
wage model but the development of trust among employers and
employees."' Low levels of supervision, according to this model, promote
136. EricaL. Groshen & Alan B. Krueger, The Structure ofSupervision andPay in Hospitals,
43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 134-S, 134-S (1990).
137. Id at 136-S. For example, monitoring the work effort of a sales clerk in a store is less
expensive than monitoring the costs of a salesperson that works outside the employer premises.
Robert Drago & Richard Perlman, Supervision and High Wages as Competing Incentives: A Basis
for Labour Segmentation Theory, in MICROECONOMIC ISSUES IN LABOUR ECONOMICS: NEW
APPROACHES 41, 43-44 (Robert Drago & Richard Perman eds., 1989).
138. Groshen&Krueger, supra note 136, at 138-S. Employees might dislike being supervised
either because they find the intrusion objectionable or because the added supervision forces them
to exert more effort than what they would consider ideal. Id.
139. In an analysis of supervisory and wage practices at hospitals, Professors Groshen and
Krueger found that nurses do not command additional compensation to endure more intensive
supervision. Id. at 143-S. Instead, their research found that hospitals that practice more intense
supervision tend to pay lower wages. The results were statistically insignificant for the other two
categories of hospital workers analyzed by Groshen and Krueger. For results consistent with the
efficiency wage theory, see, e.g., Alan Krueger, Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination
of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry, 106 Q. J. ECON. 75, 75-101 (1991); Douglas Kruse,
Supervision, Working Conditions, andthe EmployerSize-WageEffect, 31 INDUS.REL. 229,238-40
(1992). But see, e.g., Jonathan Leonard, Carrots and Stichs: Pay, Supervision, and Turnover, 5 L
LAB. ECON. S136, S136 (1987) (finding that increased supervision has insignificant effects on
wages in six different occupations).
140. Drago & Perlman, supra note 137, at 43-45.
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trust so that employees choose effort levels that are equitable and
consistent with the trust employers have shown.141
One interesting implication of the trust explanation is the effect that
different technologies have on the incentive structure. The model also
suggests that different kinds of supervision are likely to have different
effects in the development of trust and in a sense involve a specific kind
of exchange. Supervisory efforts that rely on non-human interaction, for
example, output monitoring or machine monitoring, are less likely to
provoke the level of distrust which in-person supervision generates.'4 2
Regardless of which view one accepts, it is clear that there exists a
relationship between the form of compensation and supervision. If
supervision provides no information about effort, the firm is likely to
pursue a compensation strategy based on results or a compensation
strategy based on time with a high wage component. Underlying this
strategy are a number of understandings. First, the parties have reached an
understanding as to what level of supervision is expected during the course
of employment. A trade-offclearly exists between compensation and level
of supervision. Employees have accepted their compensation on the
understanding that a given level of supervision will follow. Second, the
form of compensation also requires an understanding regarding the parties'
expectations with respect to the duration of the employment relationship.
The risk-sharing and sorting functions of employment contracts suggest
that employees and employers will structure the terms of employment with
a given set of expectations as to how long the employment will last.
To the extent that these understandings are part of the work contract,
any changes that affect the contours of these agreements should be
recognized as changes in the employment contract, and treated as such by
the parties, and, in the event of a dispute, by the courts. For example, an
attempt by an employer to alter the amount of supervision, without a
corresponding change in compensation, might involve a violation of the
parties' understandings regarding the trade-off between wages and
supervision. These changes can occur in a number of ways. For instance,
technological advances, particularly deriving from advances in computer
technology, are reducing in an increasingly rapid fashion the cost of
monitoring workers in some industries.143 For example, it is possible for
employers to monitor the employees' use of computers, such as, key-
strokes and internet use, without the employees' knowledge."4 Similarly,
141. Id
142. Id at53.
143. Michael J. McCarthy, VirtualMorality: A New Woriplace Quandary, WALL ST. J., Oct
21, 1999, at BI (describing various ways in which employers can utilize computers to monitor
employees at work).
144. Gene Bylinsky, How Companies Spy on Employees, FORTuNE, Nov. 14, 1991, at 131,
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the use of video cameras and other surveillance devices continues to be on
the rise. 45
B. The Basis of Pay
There are three types of pay arrangements in employment contracts:
employers can pay employees by the hour, on a salary basis, or based on
results."4 Hourly work is directly linked to time at work during a pay
period. 47 A large majority of employees in the United States are employed
under arrangements in which they are paid for the time they work. 43
Hourly pay incentives are likely to occur under three scenarios. First, to
the extent that the pace of the job is controlled by the employer or dictated
by the work situation rather than controlled by the worker, employers are
more likely to rely on hourly pay, since it facilitates a fixed relationship
between time at work and the output produced. 49 Second, hourly pay is
more attractive to employers to the extent that the individual employee's
output is observable by the employer at the time it is produced.' 50 Finally,
hourly pay is more likely to be used when the job involves tasks whose
duration is certain and easy to predict, since this predictability makes it
possible for the employer to plan staffing and production requirements.' 5'
Salary compensation refers to situations in which the contract specifies
a weekly or monthly salary."5 While salary contracts normally include an
agreement about general tasks and normal hours on the job per salary
period, the salary is not adjusted from period to period if actual hours or
output are more or less than normal.'"
Government employees are an example of the use of salary payoffs."
Compensation is generally independent of output and depends primarily
on time worked, although pay does not vary strictly from month to month
132; see also S. Elizabeth Wilborn, RevisitingthePubliclPrivate Distinction: Employee Monitoring
in the Worlqplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 825-27 (1998) (describing various other examples of
workplace monitoring).
145. More traditional forms ofrmonitoring have not been abandoned, as, for example, the use
of supervisors to observe workers while at work. Tony Horwitz, Mr. Edens Profits From Watching
his Workers' Every Move, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1994, at A9.
146. Fama, supra note 105, at 25.
147. Id
148. FLANAGAN, supra note 10, at 251.
149. Sheldon E. Haber & Robert S. Goldfarb, Does Salaried Status Affect Human Capital
Accumulation?, 48 INDUS. &LAB. REL. REV. 322,326 (1995).
150. Id
151. Id.
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depending on actual time worked. 5 ' Job descriptions are normally well
defined. Screening by means of entrance exams and monitoring of
performance during probationary periods are fairly common parts of the
workplace.' 56
Under result-based compensation (RBC), pay is made proportional to
outcome. 57 RBC utilizes individual or group performance indicators as
proxies for labor inputs.'5" Among the different types of RBC systems,
piece-rates systems are the most widely known.' Under piece-rate
systems, rewards are contingent on the number of units of output produced
subject to some minimum qualitative standard."W The main advantage of
the piece system is that it tracks variations in individual effort very well.
161
The 1890 Census of Population reports that eighteen percent of the labor
force was employed under a piece-rate type of arrangements. 62 The use of
piece rates continued to grow over the next couple of decades,
experiencing a high during the 1920s, corresponding to the period of the
height of scientific management. 63 While there was a reduction in the use
of piece-rate based compensation for a number of years, variants of the
piece-rate system have resurged in the last couple of decades. Recently,
there has been experimentation with RBCs at the group level and across
other industries, including what observers deem to be firms with
sophisticated human resources practices.'6 Profit sharing and productivity
gain sharing are examples of RBCs based on group performance. 65 Profit-
sharing programs base employee's compensation on changes in the firm's
profits.' Productivity gain sharing programs normally base bonus
155. "A salaried employee is compensated not for the amount of time spent on the job, but
rather for the general value of services performed." Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F. 2d 483, 486
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1068 (1991), rev'd by regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)
(2000); see also Edward P. Lazear, Salaries and Piece Rates, 59 J. Bus. 405, 406-07 (1986)
(identifying the factors that influence the employer's decision to pay on the basis of time or on the
basis of output).
156. Lazear, supra note 155, at 407.
157. Id. at 406.
158. Nalbantian, supra note 86, at 16.
159. Brown & Philips, supra note 91, at 81.
160. Nalbantian, supra note 86, at 16.
161. Ia
162. Id. at 31 (discussing the reliability of such an estimate and arguing that such an estimate
was probably low).
163. Id. at 32. Scientific management is associated with the writings of Frederick Taylor and
exposes the basic premise that "the best management is a true science." FREDERICK W. TAYLOR,
THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 7 (1911).
164. George P. Baker etal., Compensation andIncentives: Practice vs. Theory, 43 J.FIN. 593,
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payments on changes in economic or physical labor productivity measures
with respect to a previously determined base. 6 7 Piece-rate type
compensation has found a new venue with the increasing use of part-time
and contingent workers.'68 Unlike more traditional piece-rate use, which
tended to involve low-pay workers, this new venue involves employees
from a variety of social and economic backgrounds. The recent use of part-
time or "gypsy faculty,"'69 has been well documented.'70 While some have
lamented the increase of part-time faculty, 171 others have alluded to the
benefits embedded in those arrangements for both employers and
employees." Similar developments are being experienced in the
information technology industry, where the term "netslaves" has been
recently coined." 3 Stock options are a commonly used form of
compensation. 74 Commentators have already noticed the similarities to the
more traditional piece-rate arrangement.'75
The use of RBCs appears to be related to a number of factors such as
the size of the firm, the lack of expectation of a long-term employment
relationship, and the level of product market competition. 76 Reliance on
piece-rate systems is more likely to exist where employees are less likely
to be permanently attached to an industry or to a particular employer."7
Similarly, piece-rates are more likely to be used where it is difficult to
assess in advance the productivity of employees.. 78 In that sense, piece
rates allow employers to save on labor-screening costs.'" The nature of the
167. Id.
168. CHRIS TILLY, HALF A JOB 13-17 (1996) (describing the increasing use of contingent
workers and part-time employees).
169. Tara Fitzpatrick, The Troubles ofAcademe: Examiningthe Problems FacedbyAmerica 's
Colleges, CHI. TRm., Aug. 31, 1997, at C14 (describing the increasing use of part-time faculty).
170. Courtney Leatherman, Part-Timers Continue to Replace Full-timers on College
Faculties, CHRoN.HIGHEREDUC., Jan. 18,2000, atA18 (reporting that between 1970 and 1997 the
proportion of professors that taught part-time increased from 22% to 42.5 %).
171. Courtney Leatherman, HeavyReliance onLow-paidLecturersSaidtoProduce 'Faceless
Departments, 'CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 28, 1997, at A12.
172. Robin Wilson, For Some Adjunct Faculty Members, the Tenure Track Holds Little
Appeal, CHRON. IGHER EDuc., July 24, 1998, at A8.
173. Missing the 9-to-5 Routine: Burnout Factor: Some Defectors Already Regret Taking on
the Stress and Grueling Hours of Web Jobs, NEwSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1999, at 67.
174. Id.
175. "The reality, though, is that the new-media and high-technology workplace today often
more closely resembles a piecework-industry sweatshop than a pristine NASA laboratory." Karl
Taro Greenfeld, Living the Late Shift; Call Them the E-coal Mines: Internet Start-upsAre Long on
Hours, Short on Millionaires, TIME, June 28, 1999, at 46.
176. Drago & Heywood, supra note 117, at 521-29.
177. Brown & Philips, supra note 91, at 82 (noting that the seasonal nature of the cannery
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work to be performed is also related to the use of piece-rates and other
RBC systems, as, for example, where there is little integration in the
production process. To the extent that the functions of the employees are
not related, piece-rates are a good substitute for direct supervision.18
There are some drawbacks associated with piece-rate systems.
Primarily, there is a concern with perverse incentives on quality.'
Similarly, piece-rates. are designed to result in little attachment to a
particular employer." Turnover costs could become excessively high,
requiring the employer to reconsider reliance on piece-rate systems."3
Notice that the high-wage strategy described earlier is not dependent
on the form the compensation package takes. That is, the high wage
strategy is possible under a RBC system, as well as under a compensation
system that pays on the basis of time. While traditionally we have not
associated piece-rate systems with the high wage strategy, under the model
developed here that is entirely possible."'
C. Relationship Between Pay Functions and Pay Basis
The employment relationship, thus, involves a complex series of
exchanges between the contracting parties. Choices regarding sorting, risk
sharing, levels of incentives, and levels of monitoring, are all part of what
the parties exchange."' These exchanges are normally not explicitly made,
at least not in the contract law sense.'" However, as the discussion above
illustrates, these exchanges are essential to the efficient operation of labor
markets. While the parties are "silent" about most of these exchanges, they
are always specific as to the form of compensation the contract involves. 18 7
The previous two parts suggest that there is a connection between the form
of compensation and the various exchanges or trade-offs parties to
employment contracts make. This part elaborates on such relationships.
180. Forexample, in production processeswhere very little equipment is used and avery small
proportion of the raw material flows through the hands of any one worker, piece rates are used as




184. Eugene L. Hartwig, Flexible Staffing: Exploding the Myths, 2000 A.B.A. SEC. OF LAB.
&EM. L. ANNUAL MEETIqN PROGRAM MATERLALS 2,4-7 (describing the range in earnings in the
contingent sector).
185. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
186. See Freed & Polsby, supra note 6, at 1098-99.
187. "Prices are by far the most neglected form of knowledge we have. The reason for this is
that the knowledge embedded in prices is not explicit; we are never conscious of it as knowledge.
It is encoded knowledge, and we are conscious only of the code." Barnett, supra note 13, at 846.
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1. Form of Pay and Sorting
The employment contract, in particular the compensation structure,
provides adequate incentives for individuals to gravitate towards the type
of arrangement that maximizes their preferences."' RBC, with its
corresponding focus on rewarding diligence and hard-work, will likely
attract the more entrepreneurial individuals."9 This group also will be less
likely to have any form of permanent attachment to a particular
employer90 On the other hand, time-based compensation agreements
focus on longer terms rewards, such as promotion and career
advancement.191 Accordingly, these type of agreements are more likely to
attract employees with preferences for a longer term relationship who
agree to be rewarded on the basis of habitual work effort over longer
periods of time and who agree to the implications of such a reward
structure.1 2
2. Form of Pay and Risk Sharing
The choice of form of compensation has obvious implications for risk
sharing. Under a salary based system, the employer shares a bigger portion
of the risk associated with fluctuations in income, by basically insuring the
employer against any such fluctuation.'93 Accordingly, we should expect
such an exchange to involve an expectation of longer time horizons and a
corresponding expectation of job security.'9' RBCs, on the other hand,
place the risk of income fluctuations on the employee.'"5 This in turn
should involve a lower expectation of job security, with a corresponding
lower sense of investment by both parties."
The argument that the use of RBC is less likely to be associated with
a long-term employment relationship is based on the risk-sharing function
of compensation. RBCs place the income fluctuation risk on the employee,
while in time-based compensation agreements, employers serve as risk
188. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
189. Pencavel, supra note 96, at 232.
190. Brown& Philips, supra note 91, at 82. The case study ofthe California cannery industry
is illustrative. Id. Employees in the industry were likely to move from one cannery to another, not
only from season to season but also within a season, even within a given day, depending on the
availability and quality of fruit the employer provided. Id
191. Pencavel, supra note 96, at 233.
192. Here I have in mind the implications in particular with respect to privacy and
employment tenure. See discussion infra Part IVA-B.
193. See supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 339-51 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of internal
labor markets for job security issues).
195. See infra notes 339-51 and accompanying text.
196. Brown & Philips, supra note 91, at 82.
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insurers. 97 Even if sometimes employees working under RBCs were
successful in avoiding wide variations in income, we should expect that on
average they will be more likely than employees paid on the basis of time
to experience income fluctuations. These fluctuations are likely to be
followed by changes in employment, as the employees seek to improve
their economic situation.19'
3. Form of Pay and Supervision
Under what conditions would an employer choose hourly wages over
salaries or RBCs over wages or salaries? The choice between wages and
salary depends on three key factors: the extent to which output is
observable and attributable to the particular employee, whether the pace
of production is controlled by the employer or by the employee, and "the
degree to which the job involves tasks whose duration is certain and easy
to predict."'" Wages are likely to be paid in those cases where the output
is observable, the employer controls the pace of production, and it is easy
to predict the duration of producing a unit of output.2"
For example, as compared to a production worker in a manufacturing
plant, the amount of time that it would take to produce a unit of output is
significantly harder to predict in the case of a scientific researcher working
in the development of a new product.2"' In the case of a production worker,
it is also likely that the output is both observable and attributable to an
individual employee and that the pace of production is controlled by the
employer via the control over the speed ofthe production line.2 °2 Thus, we
should expect contracts involving production workers to rely on hourly
wages and those involving research scientists to rely on the use of
salaries.203
What factors affect, in turn, the choice between time-based
compensation and RBC? One key aspect of this decision relates to the type
of work involved. RBCs are more likely to take place in situations where
it would be too costly to supervise the employee directly or where
supervision of the employee's effort is "noisy" and thus provides little
information about the relationship between effort and productivity.2 4 In
these cases, employers are shifting the risk associated with fluctuation in
197. See infra notes 339-51 and accompanying text.
198. Seegenerally Sharon R. Cohany, Workers inAlternativeEmploymentArrangements, 119
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 31 (1996) (describing the relatively short tenure of contingent employees).
199. Haber & Goldfarb, supra note 149, at 326.
200. Id
201. Id. at 325.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 325-26.
204. Pencavel, supra note 96, at 231-34.
695
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income to employees. °5 Employees are accepting this shift with the
expectation that they will be able to perform their job in a more
autonomous manner.2° Obviously there is a need for supervision under
both regimes."° However, the type of supervision that is envisioned is very
different under each approach, since the type of shirking that could
potentially occur is different under each. In time-based arrangements,
shirking could occur in the form of reducing the pace of work. °
Accordingly, supervisory effort is directed at monitoring the pace at which
individuals work.2" When payment is based on results, shirking takes the
form of a tendency for the quality of product to fall.210 Supervision thus
focuses on examining the output to determine the care and assiduousness
exhibited by the workers"
A clear, and perhaps extreme, example ofthis is the case of a restaurant
waitress. In a fascinating study of a group of waitresses in a New Jersey
restaurant, Greta FoffPaules describes the relationship between form of
pay and supervision 2 Paules notes that despite what appears to be a
number of demeaning and unpleasant features of the job, the waitresses
enjoyed a substantial amount of autonomy in their job, due to the very
weak form of supervision to which they were subject.213 This large degree
of autonomy, argues Paules, can be attributed in large measure to the
tipping system.214 The tipping system transfers control of the employee's
income to the public, divesting "management of a traditional source and
symbol of managerial authority."215
In short, the analysis in this part suggests that when entering
employment contracts, employers make specific calculations concerning
issues like supervision and job security. Employers will rely on
compensation agreements that minimize their labor costs. This calculus is










212. See GRETAFOFFPAULES, DISHINGITOUT:POWERANDRESISTANCEAMONG WAITRESSES
IN A NEW JERSEY RESTAURANT 169-78 (1991).
213. "I'm so relaxed at [the restaurant] because... when I come in there, it's what I want to
do, regardless of what you say, you know. Like, 'Don't tell me nothing. I know what I got to do."'
Id. at 77 (quoting a waitress).
214. Id. at 54.
215. Id.
216. In making this determination employers will considervarious other factors. For example,
[Vol. 53
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D. Summary
There appears to exist specific kinds of exchanges in employment
contracts that are related in a non-trivial way to the type of compensation
arrangement that the parties incorporate in those contracts. Identifying
these exchanges allows us to better understand the rights and obligations
of parties to employment contracts.
The analysis in this Part suggests at least two specific exchanges. First,
there is a very specific relationship between the form of compensation and
the level, intensity, and kind of supervision. Second, the analysis of this
Part also identifies a relationship between form of compensation and
allocation of risk regarding job security and fluctuations in the stream of
income. Employers are likely to shift from time-based compensation to
result-based systems in response to the difficulties associated with
monitoring the work effort of employees. Thus, in entering a RBC type of
agreement employers are giving up their ability to monitor employees'
work effort, not altruistically, but because it is efficient to seek to motivate
employees not by direct supervision but by the use of incentive pay
systems. Employees in turn agree to the increased autonomy associated
with RBCs, but have to pay a price, to wit, the increased risk associated
with income fluctuations under this type of arrangement.
Notice that the idea that there is some specific relationship between the
form of payment and other aspects of the employment contract has been
recognized in a number of statutes. Probably the most notable example is
the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA).217 The FLSA establishes for a broad
range of workers a federally mandated minimum wage2 and premium
wage rates for overtime work."9 While the FLSA is intended to be
comprehensive and thus covers a wide sector of the labor force,22 it
specifically exempts from its coverage all employees who work in a "bona
fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity."'22 This exclusion
from the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA is in part
based on the premise that employees employed in those capacities provide
in comparing the costs of monitoring output versus effort, the familiarity of employers with their
employees might lead employers to one form of monitoring over the other. Drago & Heywood,
supra note 117, at 509. Other factors such as plant size and product market competition might also
be relevant Id.
217. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000).
218. Id. § 206(aX1).
219. Id. § 207(aXl).
220. PeterD. DeChiaraRethinklngthe Managerial-ProfessionalExemption ofthe FairLabor
Standards Act, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 139, 144-49 (1993) (describing the origins of the FLSA).
221. 29 U.S.C. § 213(aX1).
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their employer services that cannot be directly tied to hours worked.' In
enacting the FLSA, Congress recognized that many ofthe tasks performed
by workers in these groups could not be confined to certain fixed hours.'
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently noted,
"[a] salaried employee is compensated not for the amount of time spent on
the job, but rather for the general value of services performed." 4
The distinction drawn in the FLSA, I argue, is consistent with the
argument made in this Article. There is a close correspondence between
the manner in which employees get paid and a number of other features of
their employment agreements. While the FLSA recognizes this
relationship, this interaction has been lost in other areas of employment
law.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY
In this Part, I discuss the legal implications of the theoretical
framework developed in the prior part. If my argument is correct, and the
details of the employment contract convey useful information in
determining the exchanges that the parties have made in establishing the
employment relationship, this information ought to be particularly helpful
in resolving disputes in areas where the courts have, for the most part,
interfered to resolve disputes by "filling the gaps" left by the contracting
parties.' Two areas in the employment law context in particular have
been exposed to this judicial technique: the employment-at-will debate and
issues involving employee privacy rights.
A Privacy Issues
Challenges to adverse employment actions on the basis of some notion
of privacy rights have involved a diverse set of factual backgrounds and
numerous legal theories.26 Employees have alleged violations of their
privacy rights based on employers' attempts to monitor their phone calls
and e-mails or to videotape their workstations.2 Employees have also
challenged no-spouse, dating, and cohabitating policies, as well as
222. DeChiara, supra note 220, at 182.
223. Id
224. Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1068 (1991).
225. See infra notes 375-89 and accompanying text.
226. See generally Kevin J. Conlon, Privacy in the Worlqlace, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 285
(1996) (surveying challenges to employers based on privacy rights).
227. See, e.g., Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174 (lstCir. 1997) (litigating video
surveillance of employees); Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980)
(litigating eavesdropping on employee's telephone calls); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (litigating an employer's right to read an employee's e-mail).
[Vol. 53
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attempts by employers to regulate other activities engaged in by employees
after the workday has ended."
As suggested by these examples, cases involving employees' privacy
rights can be categorized as involving on-the-job or off-the-job activities.
In this Part, I briefly discuss both the basic legal theories that have been
used in each type of case and the implications that the model developed
earlier has on these cases.
1. Background
a. Off-the-Job Activities
Off-the-job-activities cases involve adverse employment decisions
based on an employee's activities outside of working hours, as for
example, dating employees of competitors, dating or cohabitating with
subordinates, and volunteering or participating in groups that the employer
might find objectionable. 9  Employees challenging these adverse
employment actions have raised a number of arguments including
statutory, constitutional, and common law.20 In general, employers have
been fairly successful in defending against these challenges. 1
228. Terry Morehead Dworkin, It's My Life-Leave Me Alone: Off-the-Job Employee
Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 47,60-72 (1997).
229. See, e.g., Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. App. 1984) (concerning
an employee fired for dating an employee of a competitor); Federated Rural Electric Ins. Co. v.
Kessler, 388 N.W.2d 553 (Wis. 1986) (concerning an employee fired for dating a subordinate);
Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974) (concerning an employee fired for
being a member of the Ku Klux Klan).
230. In this part I concentrate on constitutional and common law arguments. A majority of
states provide employees with some version of off-duty privacy protection laws. See Dworkin,
supra note 250, at 49-56. By in large, these statutes are directed to the protection of smokers who
smoke outside the workplace. However, at least four jurisdictions have enacted language broad
enough to cover other off-duty activities. E.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (1999) (making
it illegal to discriminate against an employee for engaging in lawful off-premises activities during
non-working hours unless termination relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is
necessary to avoid a conflict of interest or appearance of conflict of interest); CNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 31-51q (2001) (prohibiting disciplining of employees on account of the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or by Article I, sections 3,4, or 14 of
the Connecticut Constitution, as long as the activity does not substantially or materially interfere
with bona fide job performance or with working relationships); N.Y. LAB. § 201-d(2Xc) (2000)
(prohibiting discrimination against employees based on off-hours, off-premises "recreational
activities" unless necessary to protect trade secrets, or unless employee activity would interfere
with a unique professional services contract); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2000) (making it
unlawful to fail or refuse to hire, discharge, or discriminate against anyone because of participation
in lawful activity off employer's premises during non-working hours unless the adverse
employment action relates to a bona fide occupational qualification).
231. See, e.g., Patton v. LC. Penney Co., 719 P.2d 854 (Or. 1986) (dismissing a wrongful
HeinOnline  -- 53 Fla. L. Rev. 699 2001
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
The nature of the cases challenging employers' attempts to regulate
off-duty activities varies depending on whether the employees work in the
public or private sector. When challenging these employers' adverse
employment actions dealing with off-duty activities, government
employees have argued that their employer violated their constitutional
right to privacy, 2 freedom of association, 33 right to marry,234 or due
process rights.
5
Generally, when reviewing challenges on the basis of the public
employees' right ofprivacy, courts have refused to implicate constitutional
privacy interests in employee cohabitation and dating cases. For example
in Shawgo v. Spradlin,2 6 two police officers were suspended for off-duty
dating and cohabitation. The disciplinary action was taken on the basis of
a broad regulation which prohibited conduct that, "if brought to the
attention of the public, could result in justified unfavorable criticism" of
either the officer or the department. 7 In finding that a police department's
suspension and demotion of two cohabiting employees did not violate the
employees' right to privacy, the Fifth Circuit noted that when a state acts
as an employer, it may be justified in imposing regulations on its
employees that would be unconstitutional if imposed on the public at
large." The court went on to apply a rational basis test, and unsurprisingly
found that there existed "a rational connection between the exigencies of
discharge claim, reasoningthat "[it may seem harsh thatanemployercan firean employee because
of dislike of the employee's personal lifestyle, but because the plaintiffcannotshow that the actions
fit under an exception to the general rule, plaintiff is subject to the traditional doctrine of 'fire at
will").
232. See, e.g., Briggs v.N. Muskegon PoliceDep't, 563 F. Supp. 585, 587 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
("When the state acts as an employer, it may not without substantial justification condition
employment on the relinquishment of constitutional rights, but it has greater latitude in restricting
the activities of its employees than of its citizens in general." (citations omitted)).
233. See, e.g., Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1544 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that plaintiff
policeman's constitutional right to association was violated when he was discharged for dating a
known felon's daughter); cf. Montgomey v. Can, 101 F.3d 1117, 1124-32 (6th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing that a no-spouse rule imposed some costs and burdens on marriage, the court
nevertheless refused to apply a heightened standard ofscrutiny to a school district's rule preventing
a married couple from working together as teachers).
234. See, e.g., Kukla v. Village of Antioch, 647 F. Supp. 799, 811 (N.D. I1. 1986) (finding
that although the right to marry is constitutionally protected, "the constitutional balance still ...
favor[s] ... regulation").
235. See, e.g., Shawgov. Spradlin, 701 F.2d470, 474-83 (5thCir. 1983) (rejecting achallenge
to an anti-cohabitation regulation based on selective enforcement). For a review of public
employees' privacy rights at the workplace, see Jennifer L. Dean, Employer Regulation of
Employee Personal Relationships, 76 B.U. L. REv. 1051, 1058 (1996).
236. 701 F.2d 470,472 (5th Cir. 1983).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 483 (citing Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238,244 (1976)).
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Department discipline and forbidding members of a quasi-military unit,
especially those different in rank, to share an apartment or to cohabit." 9
Challenges based on a constitutional right to marry' or on selective
enforcement in violation of due process rights"4 have encountered similar
resistance. Courts have broadly construed the state's interest in regulating
the off-duty activities of public employees. 2
Private sector employees have brought claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, have invoked the public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine, and on a very limited basis have raised
breach of contract claims. Like their counterparts in the public sector,
private sector employees have also experienced the courts' reluctance to
second-guess employers' decisions to terminate employees based on the
employees' off-duty activities. In general, the courts have limited the
extent of these doctrines in cases involving off-duty conduct, even though
the same doctrines have been successfully raised in other areas of
employment litigation.
For example, private sector employee plaintiffs raising claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress have found the burden of proof
difficult to satisfy.243 In intentional infliction of emotional distress cases,
courts normally require that the defendant's conduct consist of "some
extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct" or
that the actions of the employer must exceed "any reasonable limit of
239. Id. Cf. Briggs v. N. Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585,590 (W.D. Mich. 1983),
af'd, 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that a police officer's dismissal for cohabiting with
a woman separated from her husband implicated First Amendment association and Fourteenth
Amendment privacy interests and stating that the "fundamental" nature of the interests involved
warranted "more than a minimal rationality" standard of review).
240. Public sector employee plaintiffs challenging employer regulation ofemployee personal
relationships have argued that the regulations violate the fundamental right to marry. See, e.g.,
Wright v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr, 58 F.3d 1130, 1134 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1041
(1996).
241. Public employees who have been disciplined under a regulation that has not been
consistently enforced or strictly followed have argued that the discipline violated their due process
rights because they lacked notice of the prohibition or because they were unaware that the
employer's regulation prohibited their conduct. See, e.g., Waters v. Gaston County, 57 F.3d 422,
424 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that rule prohibiting employees who marry each other from working
in same department is not a violation of the due process clause).
242. See, e.g., Kukla v. Village ofAntioch, 647F. Supp. 799,812 (N.D. IIl. 1986) (noting that
heightened protection for the right to marry is counterbalanced by the government's heightened
interest in maintaining a well-functioning police department and providing police protection to the
community). See also Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 580 (7th Cir. 1995) (requiring the state to
show only a plausible reison to justify a regulation prohibiting prison guards from "becoming
involved socially with inmates in or out of the Liail]" (alteration in original)).
243. See Wilbom, supra note 144, at 844-46.
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social toleration."' This has proven to be a very hard standard for
employees to meet.245 When employees are discharged for off-duty
activities, courts have reasoned that the act of terminating the employee is
not beyond the bounds of socially acceptable behavior, regardless of the
reasoning behind the termination.2'
For example, in Patton v. JC. Penney Co.,'7 the Oregon Supreme
Court rejected a dismissed employee's claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In Patton, the employer dismissed the plaintiff for
dating a coworker, despite the absence of any written or unwritten policy
on the issue and despite the fact that the social relationship did not
interfere with the plaintiff's performance at work.24 The Oregon Supreme
Court found that although the supervisor's conduct may have been "bad
conduct or offensive conduct," '249 it was "not an 'extraordinary
transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable' behavior." 0
The few plaintiffs that have been successful in this type of claim have
focused not on the employer's decision but on the manner in which the
decision was implemented. Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp. is one of the few
successful intentional infliction of emotional distress (IED) cases. In
Rulon-Miller, the employer terminated the plaintiff because of her
romantic involvement with the manager of a rival firm."2 In finding that
there existed sufficient evidence to support a jury's verdict that the
dismissal constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court
particularly objected to the manner in which the dismissal had been
handled. The court noted that the employer had acted deceptively and
oppressively when he unilaterally terminated the plaintiff without giving
her a chance to consider her options.2 3 In particular, the court noted that
the plaintiff's supervisor had told her that she would have the chance to
choose between her job and her relationship, only to renege the following
day, telling the plaintiff that he was "making the decision for [her]."'
According to the court,
244. Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 719 P.2d 854,857 (1986) (quoting Hall v. May Dept. Stores,
637 P.2d 126, 137 (Or. 1981)).
245. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional
Infliction ofEmotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6-7,21-24 (1988).
246, E.g., Patton, 719 P.2d at 857.
247. Id.
248. During the time the plaintiff was engaged in the relationship, he had earned several
performance awards given by the employer. Id. at 856.
249. Id. at 857.
250. Id. at 858.
251. 208 Cal Rptr. 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
252. Id. at 527.
253. Id. at 534-35.
254. Id. at 534.
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[The supervisor's] unilateral action in purporting to remove
any free choice on her part contrary to his earlier assurances
also would support a conclusion that his conduct was
intended to emphasize that she was powerless to do anything
to assert her rights as an IBM employee. And such
powerlessness is one of the most debilitating kinds of human
oppression.255
Thus, in limiting the availability of this tort, courts appear to be willing
to interfere with the employer's decision only when the terminations are
handled in an excessive manner. Courts, however, do not appear to be
interested in questioning, as a matter of tort law, the rationale for the
decision to terminate the employee, and they assume that the employer can
indirectly control the activities of employees even outside of work. Courts
have not inquired whether the parties to the employment contract have
addressed any of these issues.
Private employees have been even less successful in challenging
adverse employment actions based on off-duty activities under a theory of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Some employees have
argued that their dismissals for off-duty activities (e.g., dating or
cohabitating) violate a public policy favoring the right to privacy.256
Normally courts have rejected this kind of argument because it fails to
define a true "public policy" and not merely a "private" interest.," Even
in cases involving dismissals based on the identity of the employee's
spouse, in which allegedly a public policy in favor of marriage could be
identified (i.e., a "true" public policy), courts have denied plaintiffs'
claims.258
In a few instances, private employees have used contract theory to
challenge adverse employment decisions taken on the basis of the
employees' off-duty activities. In Rulon-Mler,259 the court, in discussing
the wrongful discharge claim of the plaintiff, framed the issue as:
255. Id. at 534-35.
256. See, e.g., Staats v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 118, 120 (W.D. Tenn. 1985)
(finding that, while freedom of association is an important social right which should not ordinarily
affect employment decisions, "the right to 'associate with' a non-spouse at an employer's
convention without fear of termination" did not involve a threatto "some recognized facet of public
policy" required under the state wrongful discharge exception to the employment-at-will doctrine).
257. Dworkin, supra note 230, at 76-78 (noting that many courts require a clearly expressed
statement of public policy in upholding a wrongful discharge claim).
258. McCluskey v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 498 N.E.2d 559 (Il. App. Ct. 1986) (finding that
terminating an employee for marrying a co-worker did not constitute a wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy despite the recognition under state law of the existence of a fundamental
right to marry).
259. Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal App. 1984).
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When [the supervisor] questioned her relationship with [her
partner], respondent invoked her right to privacy in her
personal life relying on existing IBM policies. A threshold
inquiry is thus presented whether respondent could
reasonably rely on those policies for job protection. Any
conflicting action by the company would be wrongful in that
it would constitute a violation of her contract rights.
260
The court then discussed a memo from the chairman of the company that
provided employees certain guarantees concerning their expectation of
privacy in off-the-job activities.26 The court concluded that the company
policy provided the employee both the right of privacy and the right to
hold a job even though "off-the-job behavior" did not meet with the
approval of the employee's manager.2 62
The breach of contract theory used in Rulon-Miller has been seldom
used in cases involving off-the-job activities, despite the plaintiff's success
in the case and despite the fact that the theory has been successfully used
to challenge other adverse employment actions.263 In part, this is due to the
fact that Rulon-Miller presented an unusually attractive set of facts for the
plaintiff (i.e., the chairman's memo) and in part due to the fact that
damages under this theory are limited to contract damages. 64
The set of cases discussed above illustrates that courts have been
extremely reluctant to second-guess employers' decisions to dismiss
employees based on their off-the-job activities. Courts have given
employers broad discretion to control, albeit indirectly, what their
employees do outside of work. It also appears that the approach taken by
courts in this area is somewhat based on the premise that employers'
ownership of employees' time is not limited to the time they are at work,
but spills over into non-working hours.
260. Id. at 529.
261. The memo provided in part:
We have concern with an employee's off-the-job behavior only when it reduces
his ability to perform regularjob assignments, interferes with thejob performance
of other employees, or if his outside behavior affects the reputation of the
company in a major way. When on-the-job performance is acceptable, I can think




263. Stewart J. Schwab, Lfe-Cyle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at
Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 11, 32-33 (1993).
264. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 401 (Cal. 1988).
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b. On-the-Job Activities
Cases in this area have involved challenges to employment practices
like drug testing,265 personal property searches,2s' honesty and
psychological testing,2 7 mandatory polygraphs,268 and monitoring of
phone calls, mail, and most recently, electronic mail.269 While the model
developed here is generally applicable to these diverse situations, I focus
the discussion on the monitoring cases.
Monitoring cases involve situations such as the interception of phone
calls" or electronic communications,2"1 the installation of video cameras
in working areas,2 and other kinds of monitoring of workstations. 2" As
in the case of off-the-job activities, somewhat different standards have
been developed for public and private employees. Public employees have
primarily relied on the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, while private employees have relied on invasion of
privacy actions, wrongful discharge claims, statutory protections under
federal and state laws, and in a very few instances breach of contract
claims.
A review of cases in this area indicates that there is wide support for
the proposition that employees retain some legitimate expectations of
privacy even while at work.274 This expectation, however, has been
narrowly defined for private sector employees. Challenges to monitoring
activities under invasion of privacy theories have been successful mainly
in the most extreme cases, such as those involving the videotaping of
restrooms and changing rooms.275 Videotaping in other areas, however, as
well as other forms of monitoring (e.g., computer based monitoring and
telephone call accounting) have generally survived invasion of privacy
claims. 276
265. See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 768 P.2d 1123, 1134-35 (Alaska 1989).
266. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632,635 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
267. See, e.g., Sorokav. Dayton Hudson Corp., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 77,79 (Cal. CL App. 1991).
268. See, e.g., Kamrathv. SuburbanNat'l Bank, 363N.W.2d 108,109 (Minn. CL App. 1985).
269. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97,98-99 (E.D. Pa. 1996).




274. Kim, supra note 7, at 703.
275. Doev. B.P.S. Guard Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422,1427 (8th Cir. 1991); Phillipsv. Smalley
Maint. Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705, 711-12 (Ala. 1983); Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983); see also Julie A. Flanagan, Restricting Electronic Monitoring in the Private
Workplace, 43 DUKE L.J. 1256, 1267 (1994).
276. See cases cited supra note 275.
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Employees have been equally unsuccessful when raising state and
federal statutory claims. For example, Title II of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended by the Electronic
Communications Act of 19 8 6,277 prohibits the monitoring of wire
communications27' and oral communications279  unless one of the
communicating parties has given consent. Title III, however, provides a
broad exception for employers. Private employers are not required to
provide any type ofnotice of monitoring to employees and are only limited
by the provision requiring that the monitoring be "in the ordinary course
of its business."' ° Courts have construed this requirement very broadly,2
8
'
in practice, giving employers complete freedom to monitor employees. 282
Employees have not fared any better under state protections, as those
statutes generally mirror the protections under Title III and have similarly
been interpreted by courts to allow broad monitoring of employees.283
The greatest protection is probably that enjoyed by public employees
under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects individual
privacy from government intrusion.2U Public employees are thus protected
from unreasonable searches whenever the employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 285 The Supreme Court has held that such an
expectation generally extends to some areas of the workplace. In
277. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2520 (1988)).
278. "Wire communication" is defined as any communication
made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of
communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the
point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in
a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or
operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign
communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
279. "Oral communication" refers to "any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting
an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation." Id. § 2510(2).
280. Id. § 2510(5Xa).
281. Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414,420 (5th Cir. 1980); Watkins v. L.M.
Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 (11th Cir. 1983).
282. See Flanagan, supra note 275, at 1269.
283. See Wilborn, supra note 144, at 842-43.
284. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated").
285. Similarprotectionsareafforded undermoststateconstitutions. Flanagan, supranote275,
at 1265.
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O'Connor v. Ortega,2' a case dealing with a state hospital official's search
of the office, desk, and file cabinet of a physician who was under
investigation concerning allegations ofmismanagement,2 all nine Justices
agreed that the physician had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
desk and file cabinets.2"' Five Justices went farther and concluded that the
doctor also had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, when he
had occupied the office for seventeen years, had kept numerous personal
materials there, had exclusive use of his desk and file cabinets, and had
never been discouraged from storing personal items at work.2 9 The
plurality warned, however, that "[p]ublic employees' expectations of
privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations
of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual
office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation." 29 The Court
accordingly adopted a test requiring not only a determination of whether
the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy, but also whether the
search was reasonable under the circumstances. 29' This latter prong
requires a balancing of the governmental interest in the efficient and
proper operation ofthe workplace with the employee's privacy interests. 92
2. Contract-Based Claims
The argument developed in this Article, I argue, provides the
groundwork for both a contract-based claim and a torts-based claim,
challenging invasion of privacy and employment terminations. In this Part,
I discuss the contract-based claim, while the next section identifies the
implications of the theory in the torts area.
Cases like Rulon-Miller,93 in which the courts have looked at the
employment contract to define the on/off-the-job boundary, provide an
example of the kind of claim that this Article proposes. However, even in
cases like Rulon-Miller, the analysis falls short of the implications of the
model developed here. If the argument developed earlier is correct,
employees in a situation similar to the plaintiffin Rulon-Miller could point
to their compensation arrangement to show that a certain understanding
regarding privacy rights had been reached by the parties. This could be
done, even in the absence of the kind of language included in the chairman
memo to IBM's employees.
286. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
287. Id. at 712-13.
288. Id. at 719.
289. Id. at718.
290. Id. at 717.
291. Id
292. Id. at 721.
293. See supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
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More generally, the focus that the model developed here places on
compensation arrangements suggests that employers do not have a valid
claim on the employees' time outside of work. This is particularly true for
employees that are paid based on results (RBCs), as well as for employees
that are paid by the hour. These employees have made no commitment to
the employer, nor has the employer sought such a commitment, other than
to the extent of the hour paid or the specific performance sought.
For example, in Brunner v. AlAttar,294 the plaintiff, an employee in an
automobile repair shop, was terminated when she notified the employer
that she was volunteering to work with an AIDS organization during her
free time.295 The employee told the employer that her volunteering work
would not affect her availability for work, that there were no dangers of
anyone at work contracting the AIDS virus, and that the customers did not
have to know about her volunteer job.2" The court of appeals affirmed the
summary judgment order in favor of the employer, since the plaintiffs
claim did not fall under the narrow exception recognized by Texas law to
the employment at-will doctrine.297 Absent from the court's opinion is any
discussion regarding any claim the employer might have to control, albeit
indirectly, the employee's off-duties activities. Assuming that the plaintiff
in Brunner was paid by either the results or by the hour, limiting therefore
the employer's control of the employee to working time, it is hard to
imagine what claim the employer could have on the plaintiff's
volunteering activities.
Employees that are paid on the basis of salary (not directly tied to a
specific number of hours) might have the weakest argument against their
employers in these types of cases. Salary compensation involves a mix of
time- and result-based compensation. Employees under salary type
compensation are not only paid according to some average number of
hours that they might be expected to be at work, but are also compensated
on the basis on some expectation that certain results will follow. By
defining the required performance broadly enough, employers can claim
that achieving satisfactory performance requires the employee to follow
certain behavioral guidelines outside of work.
Take, for example, the case of a top executive in a not-for-profit
charitable organization whose job duties include fund-raising as well as
managing the affairs ofthe organization. The charitable organization could
argue that by paying the individual a salary, the parties have mutually
294. 786 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
295. Id. at 784-85.
296. Id
297. "That narrow exception covers only the discharge of an employee for the sole reason that
the employee refused to perform an illegal act." Id. at 785 (citing Sabine Pilot Serv. Inc. v. Hauck,
687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985)).
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agreed that the employee will not engage in any activities that jeopardize
her ability to perform her job duties. In that sense, employers can make a
stronger argument that the understanding with the employee as to the
amount of control the employer has over the activities of the employee
extends even after working hours. Such an argument might give the
employer a greater measure of control over the employee's off-the-job
activities.29
A similar contract-based claim can be made in cases involving
monitoring of employees' behavior at work. First, the model advanced
here suggests that the right to monitor the behavior of employees while at
work should be treated as any other term of employment. As such, there
is not an a priori reason to expect that monitoring rights are the same
across the wide variety of diverse workplaces. While we should expect that
all employment contracts would involve some kind of monitoring (either
of the performance or the output),29 not every contract will involve the
same understanding regarding the level and amount of monitoring.
Accordingly, in deciding disputes over privacy rights, courts should search
for information in the employment relationship that illuminates the parties'
understanding. The form of compensation to which the parties have agreed
provides such information.
The analysis of compensation agreements suggests that result based
compensation (RBC) is used when the costs of monitoring efforts are high,
and the costs of monitoring output are low. Employees that agree to this
form of compensation are accepting the risk of income variability in
exchange for higher wages. Employers understand that the costs of
monitoring efforts are high and thus see it as a cost saving measure not to
be involved in the monitoring of effort: that is, employers are agreeing not
to monitor the way employees accomplish their job. Employees in these
contracts thus have bargained for greater autonomy in their workplaces.
Therefore, unless otherwise specified in their contracts, RBC employees
have a strong claim that any attempts by the employer to monitor their
conduct on the job are outside the parameters of their employment
contract.
Compensation agreements that rely on time (hourly wages and salaries)
are used when it is less costly to monitor effort than to monitor output.
Under these arrangements, monitoring of work effort is expected. The
employer agrees to pay by the time and thus assumes the risk of variations
in productivity. The employee is in effect paying for the costs of
298. See, e.g., Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574N.E.2d 370,372 (Mass. 1991) (rejecting a claim
of a defense contractor spokesperson who was fired for criticizing increased defense spending at
a news conference, reasoning that the spokesperson statements were directly contrary to the
company's financial interests).
299. See supra notes 200-13 and accompanying text.
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monitoring by agreeing to a lower wage rate. Employees that agree to
time-based forms of compensation are in a sense agreeing to a larger
degree of employer monitoring of work activities.
It is important to emphasize, however, that even in the case where the
employee has agreed to a larger extent of monitoring activity, the
employer does not have an "unlimited" right to monitor employees. There
must be some correspondence between the amount of monitoring and the
wage differential employees have accepted.
In a sense, the basic core idea of the approach advanced here is similar
to that of the approach adopted by the Court in the O'Connor decision."
Workplaces operate under very different dynamics. We should expect
employers and employees to make different, jointly maximizing
adjustments to their work environments in light of the circumstances they
face. The role of the courts, when disputes arise, is to determine what those
adjustments were and to give them validity. The information encoded in
compensation agreements provides a source of information to accomplish
this task.
3. Tort-Based Claims
In addition to the contract-based claims, the framework advanced in
this Article might have implications for other kinds of claims. For
example, cases like Shawgo v. Spradlin3°' appear to be based on the
rationale that when regulating the off-the-job activities of employees,
employers are exclusively doing so on the basis of business interests, since
after all that is what employers seek to maximize. The argument that
employers maximize goals other than efficiency (e.g., power) should
provide some validity to the argument that employers are overreaching
when terminating employees for off-duty activities." 2
Second, the cases reviewed above also indicate that courts have not
paid any attention to the form of compensation as a source of information
regarding the nature of the employment contract. In the cases raising the
lIED claim, for example, courts have assumed, without any further
inquiry, that the act of firing employees for their off-the-job activities is
not "outrageous" enough to meet the tort's standard. Courts have reached
this conclusion even in the absence of any contract language suggesting
off-the-job activities are the basis for employment decisions. This
conclusion appears to be premised on the belief that the employer has the
right to control off-the-job activities. The framework developed in this
Article provides the basis for an alternative argument. An employer's
300. See supra notes 286-92 and accompanying text.
301. 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1983).
302. Bowles, supra note 65, at 17.
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attempt to justify a dismissal on activities occurring after working hours
could be interpreted as an attempt to control the employee during a time
period that the parties have not included in their initial agreement. In the
context of HIED claims, courts could use this information to help define the
contours of actionable conduct. By looking at the compensation
arrangement, the argument could be made that there was an understanding
that the off-the-job activities of the employee were outside the reach of the
employer, and thus any attempts by the employer to control such a sphere
in the employee's life by means of adverse employment actions are, by
themselves, outside the sphere of reasonableness.
B. Job Security: The Employment-at-Will Debate
1. Background
Employment-at-will represents the basic common law rule governing
the employment relationship in the United States. 3 Under the at-will rule,
the employment relationship is presumed to be at will, unless there is an
agreement to the contrary.3 4 The major implication of this presumption is
that either party can terminate the employment relationship at any time for
basically any reason." 5
Over the last several decades the at-will presumption has been eroded
both by statute and by common law.3" A myriad of statutes, at federal,
state, and local levels, prohibit terminating employees for certain reasons.
At the federal level, Title VII prohibits employment terminations based on
sex, race, ethnicity, or religion. 7 The National Labor Relations Act
prohibits employment decisions based on the decision of an employee to
engage or not to engage in collective bargaining." Similar protections
exist at the state and local levels."9
Courts have also created a number of exceptions to the at-will doctrine:
the public policy exception, the implied contract doctrine, and the
303. See generally MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 24-30
(1998). On the origins of the doctrine see generally Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration ofIndefinite
Employment Contracts In the United States and England: An HistoricalAnalysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L.
J. 85 (1982); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM J. OF
LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976); and Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic
Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At Will, 59 Mo. L. REv. 679,680-773 (1994).
304. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (Tam. 1884).
305. Id
306. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 303, at 30-31.
307. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
308. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
309. For a summary of the various state and local level protections, see RESEARCH INSTITuTE
OF AMERICA, INC., EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR (1999).
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing doctrine.31 0 The public policy
exception involves situations in which the termination of the employee
contravenes some explicit, well-established public policy.311 Under this
doctrine, employers are prohibited from firing employees for actions
supportive of public policy, as for example firing an employee for refusing
to violate the law or for claiming benefits to which the individual
employee is legally entitled.31
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing doctrine is based on the
contract law principle that neither party to a contract should be allowed to
engage in behavior that denies the other party the benefit of the bargain. 3
Courts have limited the application of this doctrine in employment cases
to situations in which employers engage in "bad faith" actions intended to
deny employees benefits and payments already earned.1 4
Lastly, and more traditionally rooted in contract law, is the implied
contract doctrine.31 5 Under this doctrine, representations made by the
employer regarding job security, disciplinary and dismissal procedures,
and other employee privileges are treated by courts as enforceable
provisions, even in the absence of an express employment contract." 6
Employees raising this exception have relied on employee manuals,
performance evaluations, and oral statements made by supervisory
personnel, as the contractual basis for the implied promise of some form
ofjob security.317
310. See David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common Law Wrongful Discharge
Doctrines: Up-date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. Bus. L. J. 645, 646 (1996).
311. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373,374-418 (Cal. 1988).
312. Cases involving the public policy exception tend to involve an adverse employment
action in response to one of the following employees' activities: (1) refusing to perform unlawful
acts, (2) whistleblowing, (3) attempting to exercise their legal rights, and (4) performing a public
duty. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 303, at 921.
313. See, e.g., Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977) ("I[]n
every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have the
effect of destroying or injuring the right ofthe other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which
means that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.").
314. Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 310, at 670-71.
315. See generally ROTHSTEIN & LEBBMAN, supra note 303, at 932-47. The implied contract
exception includes both cases based on written and oral communications (e.g. Chiodo v. Gen.
Waterworks Corp., 413 P.2d 891 (Utah 1966); Wooley v. Hoffinan-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A 2d 1257,
modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985)) as well as cases based on conduct (e.g. Grouse v. Group
Health Plan Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981)).
316. See, e.g., Small v. Springs Indus., 357 S.E.2d 452,454-55 (S.C. 1987) ("It is patently
unjust to allow an employer to couch a handbook, bulletin, or other similar material in mandatory
terms and then allow him to ignore these very policies as 'a gratuitous, nonbinding statement of
general policy' whenever it works to his disadvantage.").
317. Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 310, at 665-69.
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2. Implications
As in the area of privacy rights, courts have completely ignored the
information this Article suggests is available in the compensation
component of employment contracts. The public policy exception, as the
invasion of privacy doctrine in the privacy area, is a tort-based doctrine
and thus focuses on "third-party" effect of employers' actions.
Accordingly, no attention is paid in this context to the particular
information that might be encoded in the employment contract. The
covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception, while based in contract
law principles, does not particularly focus on the parties' specific intent
but on some general understanding of fair play. As such, courts applying
this doctrine have not looked for information in the employment contract
that indicates whether the parties have reached specific understandings
regarding job security rights.
The implied contract exception is probably the exception closest to
suggesting the kind of questions raised by the approach advanced in this
Article. By looking at issues such as whether a specific disciplinary
procedure was outlined in the employee manual31 or whether specific
promises were made to the employee regarding the relationship between
job performance and job security,319 courts are inquiring into
understandings that the parties might have reached when commencing the
employment relationship. However, not even under this approach, have the
courts searched for the information I argue is available by looking at the
compensation arrangements.
As discussed above,32 there exists a relationship between the form of
compensation and understandings concerning the duration of employment.
Pay agreements serve sorting and risk-sharing functions, among others.
The sorting function involves the matching of jobs with the "right" kind
of employees, while the risk-sharing function involves the allocation of
risks between employers and employees.32" ' By properly structuring the
compensation package, employers should be able to attract employees that
are willing to share the risks associated with conditions exogenous to the
workplace in a manner employers find efficient.3"
On a sliding scale comparing time-based compensation and result-
based compensation, it could be argued that time-based arrangements are
based on an expectation of long-term employment. Employers use time-
318. Woaley v. Hoffinan-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J.
1985).
319. Ohanian v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101, 104 (1985).
320. See supra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
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based systems when they are trying to attract specific individuals. For
example, salary compensation shifts the risk associated with income
fluctuation to the employer and is more conducive towards the internal
labor market. Both of these features are likely to be of interest to
employees that seek some measure of job stability.
Consider for example, the internal labor markets (ILMs) model. The
employment relationship can take a variety of forms.3" Employers and
employees can enter discrete contracts of fairly short duration and with no
expectation of continuing employment. 24 These types of arrangements
have been described as encompassing what economists call external labor
markets (ELMs).3" ELMs are characterized by large numbers of workers
and large numbers of employers?26 In general, ELMs are considered
relatively competitive due to the mobility of workers and the competition
among firms for these new workers.327
ELMs operate on two basic assumptions. First, the tasks performed by
employees are of a general kind, in the sense that there is very little about
the task that is specific to the particular organization.32 "General skills"
are learned by employees at their expense and thus require no training
from the particular firm.329 "General skills" are equally valuable to any
other firm in the search for the same type of knowledge.33 Second, within
the ELM context there is no expectation of a long-term employment
relationship.33 Both parties to employment contracts within the ELM can
terminate the contractual relationship without incurring any substantial
loss.
3 3 2
Not all employment transactions, however, are of this form. Somejobs
require the learning of skills that are somewhat specific to the particular
323. OAIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND IERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 57-81 (1975).
324. Id.
325. Michael L. Wachter, Labor Law Reform: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back, 34
INDuS. REL. 382,385-86 (1995); see also Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and
Economics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of
Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1353 (1988).
326. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 325, at 1357.
327. Id. This "ideal" view of the external labor market is realized only under a very detailed,
specific set of assumptions (e.g., perfect information, workers' mobility, profit maximization).
Where these conditions are not met, market distortions can arise. DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS AND POLICY 25-28 (1992).
328. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 325, at 1358-64 (distinguishing between firm-specific
skills that are not easily transferable to other firms and general skills that are easily transferable
across firms within the same industry); see also BECKER, supra note 109, at 29-31.
329. BECKER, supra note 109, at 29-31.
330. Id.
331. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 325, at 385.
332. Id.
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contracting firm 33 These "specific skills" are valuable only to the
particular firm, and thus there are no incentives to acquire them within the
ELM context. 3 Employees will be reluctant to invest in skills that are
only valuable to a particular employer in the absence of some expectation
of a long-term employment relationship. 3" Employers will be equally
reluctant to train employees in these more specific skills, since there is no
guarantee that employees will stay with the firm or will perform in a way
that allows the employer to recover the costs associated with the training
of employees.336 Thus, the need arises to devise a mechanism that will
create the right kind of incentives for the acquisition of firm-specific
skills.3 37
ILMs provide such a mechanism and thus constitute an alternative to
exclusive reliance on the use of ELMs.3  ILMs arise because of the
ELMs' inability to deal with employment transactions when there is a need
for skills that are specific to a firm. 39 Implementation of an ILM requires
the employers and employees to agree to an understanding of a long-term
employment relationship.
By internalizing parts ofthe employment relationship, firms potentially
can encourage workers to make long-term investments with them, which
in turn produce technological and cost efficiencies for the firm .34 The
"internalizing" involves undertaking certain types of investments inhuman
capital." Employees invest early in their career while learning the skills
required by performing a job at a wage rate lower than what they could
potentially get elsewhere (e.g., the employee's opportunity wage). 42
333. Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353,366-67 (describing the
relationship between internal labor markets and specific jobs skills). "The key premise of the
relational contract model of labor markets is that many job skills are learned on the job and are
specific to the firm. Employeesworkin teams, andtasks are complex." Id. (emphasis added). Oliver
Williamson et at., Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic
Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250,251 (1975).
334. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 325, at 1358.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking Glass: Can Title VII Help
Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1517, 1521-24 (1995)
(discussing the development of internal labor markets and their application to employment
discrimination problems).
338. Wachter& Cohen, supra note 325, at 1358 (asserting that ILMs arise because ofthe costs
ofjob-specific or firm-specific skills); see also Wachter, supra note 325, at 385-86.
339. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 325, at 1358-64.
340. Id at 1360-61.
341. Wachter, supra note 325, at 385.
342. Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment At
Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8, 12-19 (1993). Professor Schwab provides an excellent analysis of the
internal labor markets concept from two different perspectives: the "specific human capital" story
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Employees recover their return on their investments at a later point in their
careers, when their actual or inside wages are higher than their opportunity
or outside wages. 43 Employers, on the other hand, invest at earlier stages
in the employee's career, by paying a wage that is higher than that
employee's marginal productivity.3" Employers recover their investment
during the employees' mid-career years.' 5 At that stage the employee's
marginal productivity is believed to exceed the wage paid by the
employer.34
6
Central to the ILMs' functioning is the expectation that employees will
be attached to the firm for a long period of time or that they will be
adequately compensated for their investments in the case of a breach.' 7
The employer arguably would not want to lose an employee with
specialized training because this would require the training of another
employee and result in a corresponding loss in productivity during the
training period.S The employees, on the other hand, will possess skills
that are not readily transferable and will therefore be reluctant to leave
employment voluntarily until after they have recovered all of their
investment.3 9 Thus, to the extent that the parties to the ILM arrangement
continue their relationship, their agreement will be fully realized.
350
and the "efficiency wage" story. Id. Under the "specific human capital" story, investments in firm-
specific skills occur under an incentive system in which both parties share the cost and benefits
associated with the learning of firm-specific skills throughout the employee's work life. Id. at 13.
Schwab points out that a critical aspect of the "specific human capital" story is the self-enforcing
nature of the employment relationship. Id. Since the "specific human capital" story assumes that
at later stages in the employment relationship, the employee's productivity is higher than the
employee's inside wage; at the same time the employee's inside wage is higherthan the employee's
opportunity wage; and consequently there is no incentive by either party to terminate the
employment relationship. Id. at 13-14. Employees have no incentive to leave the firm, since they
are being paid more than what they could make in the outside market, and employers have no
incentive to fire the employees, since their productivity exceeds their wages. Id. Under the
"efficiency wage" story, while employees' productivity later in their careers is higher than their
outside or opportunity wage, their inside wage, at that stage, is even higher. Id. at 15. Consequently,
there exists an incentive on the part of the employer to terminate late-career employees, since their
wages exceed their productivity. Id. at 16. My description of the development of internal labor
markets is consistent with Professor Schwab's "efficiency wage" story.
343. Id. at 18; see also Wachter & Cohen, supra note 325, at 1363.
344. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 325, at 1361.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Paetzold & Gely, supra note 336, at 1522.
348. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 325, at 1361.
349. Id. at 1363.
350. See Paetzold & Gely, supra note 336, at 1523; Wachter, supra note 325, at 385; see also
George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers: The Law And Economics
Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OFNEW YORK UNIVERSITY 43RDANNUALNATIONAL CONFERENCEON
LABOR 109 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990) (applying the internal labor model to the issue of strikers'
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As this account suggests, employees working in ILMs that are paid on
the basis of time are entering employment relationships that include a
certain degree of job security. While this expectation is not explicitly
spelled out, the compensation structure that is embodied in the contract of
employment appears to have avery close, one-to-one relationship with this
expectation.
Consider as an example the situation of the employee in Bay v. Times
Mirror Magazines."' While Bay involved a challenge under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act,352 the case is illustrative of the
possible application of the framework advanced in this Article. The
plaintiff in Bay was terminated after complaining about a number of
organization changes that affected his immediate position. 3 At the time
of dismissal the plaintiff was earning a base salary of $150,000 and was
eligible for an annual bonus of approximately $45,000."4 The Court of
Appeals upheld the summary judgment order of the plaintiff's ADEA
claim, on the grounds that the employee had not established that the
dismissal occurred because of his age. 5
The result in the Bay case could arguably have been different under the
approach suggested here. The plaintiff had been employed for over fifteen
years and was paid on the basis of salary. An expectation of some degree
of job security arguably existed in this case. The employee could have
claimed that his compensation agreement involved an expectation ofjob
security similar to that existing under a just-cause employment contract.
replacements under the NLRA). While solving the problem regarding the acquisition of specific
skills that is caused by the discrete nature of transactions in the ELM, ILMs raise problems of their
own due to the highly specific nature of the investments that workers and employers may be
making in each other. Specific skills are, in a sense, sunk investments. Once these investments have
been made, a bilateral-monopoly type of bargaining is created, which is ripe for strategic or
opportunistic behavior. "Opportunistic" behavior appears when one party or the other attempts to
breach the ILMs arrangement by trying to "expropriate" the returns that the other party expects out
of its investments. The incentives for the employer to comply with the implicit contract are
significantly reduced once the employer has recouped its investment. Thus, if the employer
terminates the employment relationship after the employees have learned the firm-specific skill and
the employer has recovered its investment but before the employees are able to recover their
investments, the employees' investments will be lost. Similarly, employers' investment could be
lost if, during the mid-career years, employees make it more difficult for employers to recover their
investments by engaging in behavior such as shirking, withholding information, or otherwise
increasing monitoring costs.
351. 936 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1991).
352. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (2000).
353. Bay, 936 F.2d at 115-16.
354. Id. at 114.
355. Id. at 117.
2001]
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The court then should have required the employer to demonstrate that the
termination was supported by just cause.356
What about employees that are paid on the basis of performance? What
does the model advanced in this paper suggest regarding their expectations
ofjob security? The compensation model leads to two major implications.
The same logic that led to the conclusion that employees paid on the basis
of time operate under an expectation of a longer-term employment
relationship would require us to conclude that employees paid under a
result-based system enjoy a diminished expectation of job security. RBC
is premised on the rationale that employees are willing to accept a greater
share of the risk concerning income fluctuations and employment
instability. In a sense, these employees appear to have agreed to operate
under something akin to an employment-at-will regime.
However, the model suggests that even this group of employees has
some legitimate expectation of employment security. This expectation is,
however, for a much shorter duration, and it is delimited by the manner in
which performance is being measured. That is, employees paid by the
result are being measured in terms of their performance. The contract
revolves around the employee's responsibility to produce a specific output.
The employee's wage is negotiated with this performance measure in
mind. The employee's wage is the result of the assessment of the risk
associated with stochastic factors that could affect the ability of the
employee to achieve the desired result, which in turn includes an
expectation that the employee will be allowed enough time to complete the
task at hand. A corresponding expectation of job security should
accompany the employment relationship. That is, the parties should be
presumed to have agreed to an employment contract at least ofthe duration
by which the performance would be measured.3"7
Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co."' presents an interesting factual
pattern. In Rowe, the plaintiff, a salesperson paid entirely on
commissions, 359 was terminated for leaving the store one day without
356. See Schwab, supra note 343, at 44, for an analysis ofthis case from the life-cycle/intemal
labor markets perspective.
357. A similar idea indeed preceded the adoption of the employment-at-will rule.
If the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the law construes it to
be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall
serve, and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the
respective seasons; as well when there is work to be done, as when there is not:
but the contract may be made for any larger or smaller term.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1765) *425.
358. 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991).
359. Id. at 270.
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explanation. 360 The employer made the following statement regarding
hiring:
When we hired commission salespeople, that's sort of a
different type of employee than a time card person. Their
main objective, the number one thing was that they must
attain their draw of a hundred and twenty-six dollars a week,
and generally, as long as they generated sales and were
honest, why, they had ajob at Wards, and that's the way we
used to hire our people."
Several years after being hired, the plaintiff received a handbook from
the employer, which contained disciplinary guidelines and a "New
Employee Sign-Off Sheet" that included a statement making clear that the
employment relationship was at-will.362 The plaintiff refused to sign the
sheet but acknowledged receiving and reading the handbook.36 The
plaintiff's employment continued for another two years until the events
leading to her dismissal took place.'
While the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff, both the court of
appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court found against the employee.365
The Michigan Supreme Court phrased the issue in terms of whether an
employer's oral statements and written policy created an employment
contract terminable only for cause.' The court found no support for the
plaintiff's contention that there existed an implied-in-fact promise limiting
the employer's ability to terminate her employment.367 The court did not
consider the implications of the compensation arrangements, on which
both parties were in agreement.
The framework developed in this Article suggests a different approach
that could have led to a different outcome. First, as a commissioned
employee (e.g., an RBC type of arrangement), the plaintiff arguably had
a lesser expectation ofjob security. However, the expectation was not null.
As suggested above, even under RBC agreements there is an expectation
ofjob security that matches the period necessary to accomplish the result
envisioned in the employment relationship. In fact, the dissent in Rowe
360. l at 270-71.
361. Id.at270.
362. "I also understand and agree that my employment is for no definite period and may,
regardless of the time and manner of payment of my wages and salary, be terminated at any time,
with or without cause, and without any previous notice." Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 271.
366. Id. at 272.
367. Id. at 271.
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raises a similar argument.36 Justice Levin forcefully argued that since the
promise made to the plaintiff stated a durational term, and since it did not
require any performance other than that she sell, the plaintiff could only
be discharged for nonperformance.369 Since she was not discharged for
poor performance, her discharge, according to Justice Levin was
inappropriate. 3
70
V. THE MEANING OF SILENCE: A DETOUR INTO CONTRACT LAW
The approach that I have advanced in this Article has implications
outside the employment law area. My basic argument is that while the
parties only explicitly negotiate over a few terms, those terms contain
information that can be useful in solving a myriad of disputes that arise
during the course of the employment relationship. To obtain that
information, we have to "distill" the explicit contract terms.
A question that still needs to be answered is how to reconcile this
argument with traditional contract law doctrine. The problem we face is
that there does not appear to be any adequate conceptual legal framework
to deal with the set of dynamics identified earlier. We come back to the
question raised by Professor Charnay, "Does anti-antformalism... lead
us back to formalism? 3 71 In this Part, I suggest a possible set of analytical
tools that could be used to make the model developed earlier operational.
The question we face is how to incorporate the understandings that I
argue the parties have made regarding job security and privacy issues into
the employment contract, given that the contract is "silent" about these
issues. An initial inquiry is how to characterize the "absence" of the job
security or privacy rights terms. Are those terms omitted from the
contract?3 2
The development of default rules has beenjustified on the premise that
the employment contract was silent on a particular question and, thus, the
court needed to step in to imply the missing terms." That is, the basic
368. Id. at 291.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 292.
371. Charnay, supra note 14, at 843.
372. Omissions in contracts are believed to occur in two situations. First, there are cases where
the parties foresaw the situation, but made a conscious decision not to address it in the contract E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 331-39 (3d ed. 1999). This could occur for
a number of reasons, such as informality, the low likelihood that the situation will arise, reluctance
to raise the matter, or lack of care in negotiating the contract. Id. In the alternative, omissions could
occur when the dispute was simply unforeseen. Id.; see also Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 540, 553 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) ("The supplying of an omitted term is not technically
interpretation, but the two are closely related. ").
373. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
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premise has been that the parties have omitted a term or a number of terms
from the contract. This practice, commonly used in contractual disputes,
has been referred to as the "implication" stage of the process used by
courts to supply a term in cases of omissions." Implication requires the
court to supply a term to resolve the dispute created by the omission."'
Courts do this by implying the existence of a term into a contract. 76 Such
terms are called "implied-in-law" terms.3" Implied-in-law terms are found
by the court to be part of a contract, even though there is no express
contract term to support it3 78 nor can the term be inferred from the conduct
of the parties."7
The implication stage, however, must be preceded by a conclusion that
there indeed exists a gap in the contract, that is, that the dispute involves
an omitted term. This initial stage, "interpretation," involves a decision by
the court that the language in the contract does not cover the particular
dispute.39 0 In deciding the "interpretation" question, courts use essentially
the same analysis that is used to decide cases involving vague and
ambiguous language.3"1 For example, courts look at "common habits and
practices inthe use of language" and the characteristics of the agreement
itself, as for example completeness. 3' Another factor that has proven to be
decisive in various cases is the issue of foreseeability.3" "If the court is
convinced that the parties could not have foreseen [the situation], and
therefore could not have intended their agreement to cover [the situation],
374. "When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with
respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is
reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court." RFsTATEmENT(SEcOND)oF CONTRACTS
§ 204 (1981); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 372, at 331-39; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261,273-76 (1985) (discussing the process ofsupplying
implied terms).
375. RESTATEMfr (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 204 crmt. c (1981) ("Interpretation may be
necessary to determine that the parties have not agreed with respect to a particular term, but the
supplying of an omitted term is not within the definition of interpretation. . .
376. Id. § 204 cmt. d.
377. Implied-in-fact terms are terms that are implied from the conduct of the parties. JOHNE.
MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 34-35 (3d ed. 1990).
378. Express terms are terms that are articulated or stated in words, rather than inferred from
the language or the circumstances. Id
379. Id.
380. See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104, 107-08 (Iowa 1981)
("'Interpretation,' the process of determining the meaning of words used, is also a matter for the
court to decide as a matter of law, unless it depends upon extrinsic evidence....")
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the court may refuse to apply the contract language, despite its apparent
applicability, and may find that the case before it is an omitted one."''
While there is some variance regarding which of these factors is
controlling and at what point the court will consider an omission case to
exist, it is clear that courts will first go over this step. That is, a court will
not supply a term, unless "it has determined that the language of the
agreement does not cover the case at hand."386
While the courts are not explicit about it, it appears that in the
employment law area, the courts have deemed the parties to be silent
regarding job security and privacy rights, answering, the interpretation
question by concluding that there is an omitted term problem. Having
reached that conclusion, courts have then proceeded, under the
"implication" stage of the analysis, to supply the missing terms.
It is my contention that the problem created by the "absence" of the job
security and privacy rights terms in employment contracts should be
addressed in the "interpretation" stage of the analysis, thus limiting the
role of courts in supplying contract terms. By properly construing the
terms of the employment contract (i.e., the compensation terms), courts
should conclude that the parties have reached specific understandings
regarding job security and privacy rights issues. The courts will only have
to enforce those terms, obviating the need for any "implication."
The focus of the inquiry then becomes what analytical tools courts can
use in interpreting the contract so as to "distill" the terms that I argue are
embedded in the compensation provisions of employment contracts. It is
crucial to note that the need for "interpretation" derives not from "vague
and ambiguous" language,3'" but from the imbedded nature of the job




388. My argument is that the employment contracts (at least with regard to job security and
privacy issues) do not fit the omission cases. First, the "omission" of these terms does not appear
to fit any of the reasons normally advanced to justify the absence of a term. For example, it is hard
to argue that neither the employer nor the employee thought about the length of the employment
relationship or about the ability of the employer to monitor the behavior ofthe employee at the time
the employment relationship was formed. Thus, we do not appear to be dealing with the type of
cases involving unforseeability. It might be plausible to argue that the parties might have made a
conscious decision not to deal with these issues. For example, employees might not raise the
termination terms in negotiations because they mistakenly believe that the law restricts the
employer's ability to terminate them to a greater extent than it does. See generally Kim, supra note
45. Second, there might be signaling concerns; employees may be worried that by raising
termination issues they will signal that they are shirkers. See Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of
Minimum Contract Terms, With Implications for Labor Law, 74 TEXAS L. REv. 1741, 1744-45
(1996) (describing efficiency failures in employment contracts).
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Accordingly, I suggest that a new concept has to be developed to capture
the essence of the kind of terms I describe here.
One way of thinking about these terms is as "proxy" and "underlying"
terms. The "proxy" term is the term that appears in the contract and that
addresses two aspects of the contract: the direct aspect for which it
expressly stands, and the underlying aspect for which it serves as a proxy.
The "underlying" terms thus are terms that should be incorporated into the
contract via the "proxy" term. In the context of employment contracts, the
"proxy" terms are the terms dealing with compensation. The "underlying"
terms are the terms dealing with privacy and job seeurity."g
These "proxy" and "underlying" terms should be used by the courts in
deciding that there are no omitted terms and then substantively uphold
their meaning. That is, the courts should read the "underlying" terms into
the contract, barring specific language to the contrary in the contract.
In this framework, the key argument is that of establishing the one-to-
one relationship between the proxy and the underlying terms. The burden
is on the party seeking to incorporate the term to show that the "proxy"
term, which was expressly included in the contract, can be related with
certainty to the "underlying" term in a particular way. This relationship
can be established by looking at developments in our understanding of
employment relationships.
VI. CONCLUSION
At a recent conference attended by labor and employment law
attomeys, 3" various participants addressed employee privacy rights and
raised questions about what access employers could have to the
employees' homes when homes become part of the workplace. The
suggestion was made that employers should have the same ability to
monitor employees at home, as in the workplace. A plaintiff s lawyer in
the room asked whether anyone was troubled by such an idea. The
389. Similar constructs have been suggested in the venue oftreaty interpretation. E.g., Michael
P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 749-53 (1998). In his
groundbreaking article, ProfessorMichael Van Alstine proposes two interrelated approaches to aid
in the interpretation of international treaties and conventions: "deductive general principles" and
"inductive general principles." Id. Deductive general principles involve distilling "the values
involved in the resolution of one normative problem and applying those values to a separate, but
analogous, situation. Id. at 749. Inductive general principles are derived, on the other hand, by
probing the values imbedded in specific provisions and from them deriving general principles. Id.
at 751. While somewhat different, these two constructs are based on the rationale that a deeper and
more prying analysis into the terms of a document (i.e., a contract or treaty) might reveal
information essential in the resolution of disputes.
390. Institute of Law and the Workplace Members Conference-1998, Chicago-Kent College
of Law.
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response by a management lawyer, which most people in the room
appeared to accept without much trouble, was that since management is
"buying" the employees' time, it is management's prerogative to monitor
the employees' performance.39
More recently, the following question was posted in an internet
discussion group. The message was:
A manager is sent by his company, at company expense, to a
national high tech trade show and conference. Various
exhibitors have donated door prizes to be awarded to
attendees based on free tickets they have received upon
registration. The manager wins the lottery drawing, a valuable
prize worth about $12,000. The certificate he receives is in
his name so that initial title resides in him. When he returns
to his office the corporate CEO informs him that the prize
actually is company property and insists that he assigns it or
its value to his employer. Question: Does the employer have
a valid claim.-
The posting generated a good amount of interesting discussion among
the list participants. Most of the respondents' initial reaction was that the
employer had a valid claim, and thus the employee had to return the prize.
Their rationale was primarily that the employee was the agent of the
employer, and thus anything he did during the course of employment was
on behalf of the employer. A couple of responses suggested that the
employee should claim that the raffle was structured in such a way that it
was not related to the employee's official duties, and thus that the
employee could keep the prize. These responses appear to also assume that
since the employee was being paid by the employer to attend the
conference, the employer owned all the time of the employee and
everything that happened in the course of the employee's employment.
This Article challenges the assumption underlying the responses to
these two situations: the assumption that employers and employees are
silent with regard to issues such asjob security and privacy rights, and thus
that default rules such as employment at will should be imposed on the
parties. While the employers in the two scenarios just described could
391. Similar concerns have already been raised in the national labor and employment law
community. Eg., Victoria Roberts Analysis andPerspective-Attorneys Say Employees' Use ofE-
mail Creating Possible Legal Pi~allsfor Employers, Daily Lab. Rep., July 6, 2000, at Cl ("The
components of an employer's e-mail policy are 'pretty clear cut within the four walls of the office,
but once you're out hither and yon,' things get more complicated.").
392. Posting of Jordan Leibman, jleibman@IUPUI.EDU, to
ALSBTALK@LISTSERV.MUOHIO.EDI (Mar. 15, 2000) (contributing to the discussion group
of the American Legal Studies in Business Association) (copy on file with the author).
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claim a right to monitor the employee who works at home to the same
extent of the employee that comes to the employer's premises and could
also claim the prize won by the employee while attending the conference,
there are not a priori reasons why such claims should be deemed valid. The
court should inquire into the nature of the various components of the work
contract on which the parties were explicit, such as the compensation
terms, and then inquire into what insights such terms bring into the dispute
at hand. Employees should be allowed to raise the argument that the nature
of their contract reflects the intent to limit the control the employer has
over the employee in both of the above scenarios. More broadly, this
Article suggests a new vision of employment contracts, a vision which
parallels the recent debate on commercial law between "anti-formalism"
and "anti-antiformalism." This Article illustrates that commercial law and
contract law have experienced parallel developments regarding the
development and use of default rules, gap fillers, and other interpretation
strategies. This Article suggests some preliminary ideas in the
development of a neo-formalist jurisprudence.
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